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HOME RULE IN ILLINOIS AFTER
TWO YEARS: AN UNCERTAIN
BEGINNING
by PAUL

P. BIEBEL, JR.*

"Home Rule, many of you might know, is like sex - when
it is good, it is very, very good, and when it's bad, it's still pretty
good."1
Home Rule is "a paradoxicalenigma, attractive and appeal2
ing, yet unattainable to any significant degree."
INTRODUCTION

The above cited comments bring to mind the close analogy

between effective home rule as it fares in the United States and
the elusive beauty as it appears in the dreams of many men eminently desirable, but never quite attainable. The delegates
to the Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention, particularly those
on the Local Government Committee, were faced with a difficult
problem - to attempt to deal with a concept that is as old as the
Magna Charta, 3 but one which has not been truly effective in
bridging the gap between the desire for local autonomy and
effectively implementing that desire.' As one commentator has
noted, "Home rule has largely been a disappointment to its
supporters."5
The framers of the 1970 Constitution accepted the challenge of attempting to create a home rule section which would
* B.A., Marquette University; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center;
Assistant State's Attorney of Cook County, Illinois, serving as Supervisor of
the Civil Appeals Section. Mr. Biebel has represented Cook County in all
home rule litigation in which it has been a party and is also presently serving
as Counsel to the Cook County Home Rule Study Commission.
1

REC. OF PROC., SIXTH ILL.

IV at 3038 (1969-70)

CONST.

Verbatim Transcripts, Vol.
[hereinafter cited as Verbatim

CONV.,

(emphasis added)

Transcripts].
2 THE
ERNMENT

CHICAGO HOME RULE COMMISSION,

at 316 (1954)

(emphasis added).

REPORT ON CHICAGO's Gov-

3Ancel, 20th Century Powers for 20th Century Cities: Constitutional
Municipal Home Rule in Illinois, 49 CHI. B. REC. 226 (March, 1968) [hereinafter cited as ANCEL].
See also ANTIEAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW
95 (1964) [hereinafter cited as ANTIEAU], quoting People ex rel. Metropoli-

tan St. Ry. v. Tax Commissioners, 174 N.Y. 417, 67 N.E. 69, 70-71 (1905).
4

See Cohn, Municipal Revenue Powers in the Context of Constitutional

Home Rule, 51 Nw. U. L. REv. 27 (1956) [hereinafter cited as COHN, Municipal Review Powers].
- Green, Home Rule Preemption and the General Assembly at 1.

(One

of the background papers prepared for the Illinois Assembly on Home Rule
held April 5-7, 1973) [hereinafter cited as GREEN].
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avoid the pitfalls that have plagued home rule advocates in
states throughout the country. The results of their efforts have
met with praise by many informed commentators. The new
Illinois home rule provisions have been variously described as
"among the most important" of the sections of the new constitution, 6 "the boldest and most innovative part" of the Local
Government Article,' "potentially the most significant departure" in the new constitution" and the "broadest home rule grant
in any state in the country." 9 This article will analyze the broad
home rule concept as envisioned and adopted by the members
of the recent constitutional convention, with particular emphasis
on the problems intended to be avoided. Thereafter, the several
early home rule decisions by the Illinois Supreme Court will be
considered in order to ascertain whether the hopes of the convention members are being realized in the initial years of home rule
in Illinois.
LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL

AUTHORITY

IN

ILLINOIS PRIOR TO THE ADOPTION
OF HOME RULE

Before home rule was adopted in this state, drastically
altering the relationship between state and local governmental
entities, Illinois law required that, absent an express grant of
local power in the constitution, local governments were "creatures" of the state - totally dependent upon the General Assembly for authority to act. 10 This theory of "legislative supremacy,"
first enunciated by Justice John F. Dillon of the Iowa Supreme
Court, has commonly come to be known as "Dillon's Rule.""
6

Baum, The Scope of Home Rule: The Views of the Con-Con Local

Government Committee, 59 ILL. B.J. 814 (1971) [hereinafter cited as BAUM,
Home Rule].
7Parkhurst, Article VII Local Government, 52 CHI. B. REC. 94
(1970) [hereinafter cited as PARKHURST, Article VII].
8 Mack, Home Rule Referenda in Illinois at 1. (One of the background
papers prepared for the Illinois Assembly on Home Rule April 5-7, 1973)
hereinafter cited as MACK].
9 Verbatim Transcripts, vol. IV at 3043.
10 REC. OP PROC., SIXTH ILL. CONST. CONV., Committee Proposals, Vol.
VII at 1603 (1969-70) [hereinafter cited at Committee Proposals].
11Justice Dillon noted in City of Clinton v. Cedar Rapids and Missouri
River Ry., 24 IOWA 455 (1868):
It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a municipal corporation possesses and can exercise the following powers and no others:
First, those granted in express words; second, those necessarily or fairly

implied in, or incident to, the powers expressly granted; third, those

essential to the declared objects and purpose of the corporation -- not
simply convenient, but indispensable. Any fair, reasonable doubt
concerning the existence of power is resolved by the courts against the
corporation, and the power is denied.

In 1872 Justice Dillon repeated this same theory in a treatise which became
quite influential in its treatment of Local Government Law: DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS ch. V, § 55 (1st ed. 1872).

1973]

Home Rule in Illinois

That rule, which also required a strict construction of legis-

lative grants of authority to local governments,1 2 aptly described
the extent of state control over local governments which had
been established by colonial legislatures in attempting to effectively govern rural communities.1 3
Illinois decisions had embraced that same principal of legislative supremacy 14 (and its effects were not removed until the
adoption of home rule). However, the same dissatisfaction in
other states with the relationship between local government and
uninformed, unresponsive legislatures 5 came to the fore in Illinois. In criticizing this relationship in Illinois, one commentator
drew the analogy between parent and child in describing the dependence of local governments upon the legislature.' 6 The late
professor David C. Baum of the University of Illinois Law
School has observed that the system was "terribly frustrating"
because local governments were forced to appeal to the General
Assembly each time there was doubt as to whether a power
existed under the statutes to initiate an activity the local government believed was needed. 7 The City of Chicago was particularly recognized as a victim of forced reliance upon a distant,
unsympathetic legislature for its authority.' 8 Adding to this
dissatisfaction was the realization that population statistics
in Illinois had fundamentally changed. At the time the 1870
Illinois Constitution was adopted, the state was populated by
12 Vitullo, Local Government: Recent Developments in Local Government Law in Illinois, 22 DEPAUL L. REV. 85 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
VITULLO]; see also, Committee Proposals, vol. VII at 1603.
13 Small, Issues for the Illinois Constitutional Convention: Urban Government at 2 (1969). (One in a series of papers prepared for the Constitutional Convention) [hereinafter cited as SMALL].
14The Illinois Supreme Court observed as late as 1964 in Ives v. City
of Chicaqo, 30 Il.2d 582, 584, 198 N.E.2d 518, 519:
The city must have an express grant of authority from the General
Assembly to enact the ordinances unless the power is necessarily implied in or incidental to power or powers expressly conferred.
Cf. Concrete Contractors Ass'n v. Village of La Grange Park, 14 Il. 2d 65,
150 N.E.2d 783 (1958) ; City of Chicago v. Ingersoll Steel & Disk Division,
371 Ill. 183, 20 N.E.2d 287 (1939).
15See Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power under Home Rule:
A Role for the Courts, 48 MINN. L. REV. 643, 655 (1964) [hereinafter cited
as "SANDALOW]; COHN, Municipal Revenue Powers, supra note 4, at 30;
ANTIEAU, supra note 3, at 121-27.
'1 Hodes, Municipal Home Rule and the State Constitution of Illinois,
30 Cm. B. REC. 249, 249-50 (1949).
17 Baum, The Constitutional Background of Home Rule at 3. (Second
Annual Local Government Law Institute, presented by The Illinois Institute
for Continuing Legal Education (1971)) [hereinafter cited as BAUM, Home
Rule Background].
isProfessor Sandalow observed in 1964:
The problem [lack of authority to adequately treat day-to-day problems]
is more acute when the municipality lacks power to undertake a program
designed to meet an important new problem. Chicago, for example, has
at times in the past been unable to regulate various occupations and
businesses vitally affecting the welfare of its residents or to license
automobile operators even though the legislature had provided no
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two and one-half million people, eighty percent of whom resided
in rural areas. One hundred years later, the population had
increased to eleven and one-half million people, eighty-five
percent of whom were living in urban areas.The change
from a predominantly rural state to one essentially urban in
character greatly altered and expanded the need for independent
local governmental authority. In 1969, the Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention presented an opportunity to consider these
problems and concerns.
THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT
COMMITTEE REPORT

The membership of the Local Government Committee of the
Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention was diverse in its political, geographical, and philosophical composition. Chairman
John C. Parkhurst was a Republican from Peoria; Vice-Chairman Philip J. Carey was a Democrat from Chicago. The committee's ranks also included Richard M. Daley, the son of Chicago's mayor; David E. Stahl, former administrative assistant
to the mayor of Chicago and later comptroller of the City of
Chicago; Robert L. Butler, mayor of downstate Marion; John
G. Woods, mayor of Arlington Heights; and Betty Ann Keegan
and Joan G. Anderson of the League of Women Voters.
Although there was a great divergence in interests, opinions
and constituencies among the members of the Local Government
Committee, indeed among the entire membership of the convention, the delegates uniformly believed that a home rule provision was needed. As Vice-Chairman Carey observed, both the
majority and minority members of the Local Government Committee favored strong home rule. They differed only in how it
could be accomplished.20 Realizing that compromise might be
the key to a successful constitutional referendum,21 the Local
system of state-wide control to protect the public.
SANDALOW, supra note 15, at 653-54 [footnotes omitted]. See also ANCEL,
supra note 3, at 227.
"I SMALL, supra note 13, at 25.
20 Carey, Home Rule Preemption by Court Interpretation,Vol. X, No. 3
at 5, (Local Government Law Newsletter, published by the Illinois State Bar
Ass'n (Feb. 1973)) [hereinafter cited as CAREY].
21 Ebel, Issues for the Illinois Constitutional Convention: Local Government Outside Illinois at 19 (1969). (One of a series of papers prepared
by the Constitutional Research Group for the delegates of the Illinois
Constitutional Convention) [hereinafter cited as EBEL].
Chairman Parkhurst has commented on the importance of compromise
leading to the acceptance of the constitution:

[M]any delegates felt that a complete devolution of autonomous powers

to home rule units, including the possibility of a highly unpopular local

income tax or payroll tax, would spell the death knell of the proposed
Constitution. The ultimate decision finally resolved itself into a broad
expression of home rule power, subject to certain specific limitations.

PARKHURST, Article VII, supra note 7, at 99.
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Government Committee issued a report which struck a politically realistic balance 3 while creating a unique solution to the
24
problem of balancing state and local power.
The Local Government Article, article VII of the 1970 Constitution, was adopted in a form nearly identical to that submitted by the committee. Accordingly, the report of the Local
Government Committee which explains the proposed article is
most helpful in ascertaining the intent behind its various provisions. 25 Heavy emphasis will consequently be placed upon that
26
report in analyzing the meaning of the new home rule sections.
Because of the unique quality of Illinois home rule,2 7 relatively
little reliance will be placed upon decisions from other jurisdictions.
THE ESSENCE OF ILLINOIS HOME RULE

In theory, home rule was enacted in Illinois to upset the
system created by an acceptance of Dillon's Rule - to constitutionally emancipate local governmental units from the absolute
control of the state legislature. Under the new home rule section,
a presumption now issues in favor of local authority except for
limitations contained within the section itself. As Chairman
Parkhurst noted, "Home rule units in Illinois will be able to do
virtually anything by local ordinance unless prohibited by the
''
Constitution or preempted by the State Legislature. 28

Perhaps the
basic alteration
authority in the
The concept

Illinois Supreme Court has best explained this
in the relationship between state and local
recent case of Kanellos v. County of Cook:
of home rule adopted under the provisions of the

1970 constitution was designed to drastically alter the relationship

which previously existed between local and State government.
,2Committee Proposals,vol. VII at 1567-1773.
GREEN, supra note 5, at 5.
24 Cole, Illinois Home Rule in Historical Perspective, at 8 (1973). (One
of the background papers prepared for the Illinois Assembly on Home Rule)
[hereinafter cited as CoLE].
23

25 BAUM, Home Rule, supra note 6, at 815.

26 The home rule section of the new constitution is contained in Article
VII, § 6. Relevant portions are set out in subsequent text and footnotes

which treat the individual provisions in detail.

27 Baum, A Tentative Survey of Illinois Home Rule (Part I): Powers
and Limitations, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 137, 157 [hereinafter cited as BAUM,

Part IL. See also VITULLO, supra note 12, at 87.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has ruled in a manner consistent with
this approach:
Cases in other jurisdictions cannot be cited as authority for the conclu-

sion here reached for the reason that no other jurisdiction has a home-

rule provision couched in the language of the home-rule amendment of

this state.

Van Gilder v. City of Madison, 222 Wisc. 58, 76-77, 267 N.W. 25, 32 (1936).
28 Parkhurst, Local Government, The Illinois Constitutional Convention,
Weekly Summary No. 32 at 11 (Sept. 3, 1970) [hereinafter cited as PARKHURST, Local Governmentl.
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Formerly, the actions of local governmental units were limited to
those powers which were expressly authorized, implied or 6ssential
in carrying out the legislature's grant of authority. Under the
home-rule provisions of the 1970 constitution, however, the power
of the General Assembly to limit the actions of home-rule units has

been circumscribed and home-rule units have been constitutionally
delegated greater autonomy in the
ernment and affairs. To accomplish
tution conferred substantial powers
only to those restrictions imposed or

determination of their govthis independence the constisubject
upon home-rule units
29
authorized therein.

The generic form of home rule in Illinois is
executing constitutional home rule. Since there
dependency upon legislative implementation this
rule has been judged to be the most effective in
states.8 0

known as selfis no inherent
form of home
use among the

Furthermore, the members of the Local Government Committee indicated an unequivocal intent to avoid any requirement
that local charters be adopted before home rule could be implemented, even though the charter process is commonly used
in states having self-executing home rule provisions in their
constitutions. 31 This decision was based on the committee's conclusion that the charter process is unnecessarily complex, placing
undesirable impediments in the path of effective rule.3 2 The com-

mittee felt that the municipal structure in Illinois was sufficiently
developed to avoid the need for charter approval of home rule

authority.33 Consequently, the constitutional grant of self-executing home rule, unencumbered by the charter process, makes
Illinois home rule the most easily implemented of any home rule
structure in the United States.8 THE REASONS FOR THE ADOPTION OF HOME RULE

The report of the Local Government Committee cogently
expresses the reasons for the inclusion of a home rule section
in the Local Government Article:
The Local Government

Committee unanimously believes that a

29 Kanellos v. County of Cook, 53 Ill. 2d 161, 166, 290 N.E.2d 240, 243
(1972).
80 See Home Rule: A Solution for Municipal Problems?, 16 Wyo. L.J. 47,
58 (1961).
It is further observed in that same article:
Thus, if the prime purpose of home rule [which is to prevent legislative
interference] is to be achieved, the Constitutional self-executing form
is the best if not the only one capable of achieving the desired result.
31 Committee Proposals, vol. VII at 1617.
32 Id.
at 1617-18.
The Local Government Committee specifically observed in this regard that in states requiring charter adoption of home rule,
many municipalities have failed to adopt charters. Colorado is cited as
a specific example, with only twenty-two of the forty-six municipalities
eligible for home rule having adopted charters.
33 Id.
at 1618.
34 COLE, supra note 24, at 8.
It is estimated by this author that home
rule in some form, either constitutional or legislative in nature, presently
.
exists in forty-one states in addition to Illinois..............
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system of home rule is superior to the existing system of legislative
supremacy, and that home rule should be included in the new
Constitution.
The fundamental reason for favoring home rule over the existing system of legislative supremacy is this: Local governments
must be authorized to exercise broad powers and to undertake
creative and extensive projects if they are to contribute effectively
to solving the immense problems that have been created by the
increasing urbanization of our society ....

The Committee believes

local government should be strengthened because it is closer to the
people it serves than are other forms of government and, as a result,
on balance is likely to be more responsible to the citizenry, more
sensitive to community needs and more efficient and effective in
meeting those needs. In addition, broadening the powers of local
governments will reduce the number of bills dealing with local matters which now overburden the General Assembly, will strengthen
the role of local officials in determining local issues and diminish the
power of state legislators who are less familiar with local conditions, and reduce the amount of State control over local affairs.
35

In short, the basic force motivating the adoption of home rule
was the desire to limit legislative interference in local affairs. ' 6
Although potential risks and abuses of home rule authority were
considered, the committee nevertheless believed that possible
shortcomings were far outweighed by the benefits which inhere to
increased autonomy in home rule units.8 7
WHAT'S A HOME RULE UNIT?
Article VII, section 6(a) entrusts home rule authority to
any county having a chief executive officer elected by the electors of the county, 3 and any municipality having a population in
excess of 25,000. All other municipalities are permitted to become home rule units by referendum.3 9 Section 6(b) provides
3 Committee Proposals, vol. VII at 1604-06.
36 See note 30 supra at 62.
37 Committee Proposals, vol. VII at 1614.
38It was felt that the requirement of an elected chief executive officer
was needed in order to insure visible, responsible and accountable leadership.
See MACK, supra note 8, at 2 and Committee Proposals, vol. VII at 1634.
At present Cook County is the only home rule county. In 1972 nine other
counties (De Kalb, Du Page, Fulton, Kane, Lake, Lee, Peoria, St. Clair and
Winnebago) attempted by referenda to become home rule units and all
failed by a margin of at least three to two. See MACK, supra note 8, at 7.
In Rock Island County the county board refused even to permit the
issue to go to referendum. In Logan County petitions for referenda were
circulated, but the issue never made it to the ballot. See Newsletter on
Home Rule, No. 1 at 10 (Nov., 1972). (Published by the Institute of Government and Public Affairs, University of Illinois) [hereinafter cited as
NEWSLETTER].
39 There are presently seventy-two home rule municipalities in Illinois.

Fifty-nine municipalities over 25,000 in population received automatic home
rule; six municipalities have achieved home rule by special census; and
seven municipalities under 25,000 in population have approved home rule
by referenda. The smallest municipality in this final category was McCook
in Cook County, with a population of 366..
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that a home rule unit may elect by referendum to no longer
remain a home rule unit.
The figure of 25,000 as the standard for automatic municipality home rule was the result of a compromise reached after
long debate and many proposed amendments. A brief discussion
of what occurred in committee and during floor debates is indicative of the various philosophical approaches which were voiced on
home rule. The Local Government Committee Majority Report
contained a proposed population figure of 20,000 for automatic
municipal home rule. The majority thought that increased home
rule powers were more urgently needed by the larger municipalities in order to achieve a satisfactory quality of life for
their citizens. 40 They were further of the opinion that only the
larger municipalities could effectively utilize home rule powers,
for only they could have a sufficiently broad revenue base needed
41
to support home rule powers in a meaningful fashion.
Six members of the Local Government Committee, including
Vice- Chairman Carey and Delegate Richard M. Daley, submitted
a minority report wherein they took the position that automatic
home rule should be granted to all Illinois municipalities regardless of size.42 Noting that the Illinois Municipal League also
opposed a classification system and that a survey of mayors of
municipalities under 10,000 indicated an overwhelming desire
for home rule, the minority contended that home rule was needed
4 3
to combat the problems of all municipalities.
These philosophical differences between the "across-theboard" advocates and the "classification" supporters 44 were
carried over and continued during the later debates on the floor
of the convention. Proposals for the adoption of population
Six municipalities under 25.000 were unsuccessful in their attempt to

attain referendum approval for home rule status. See MACK, supra note 8,
at 2-3; NEWSLETTER, supra note 38, No. 3, at 5 (May, 1973).
Approximately sixty percent of the population in Illinois resides in
municipalities over 25,000; BAUM, Part I, supra note 27 at 143, n. 23.

Over two-thirds of the home rule municipalities are located in the six

northeast counties of Illinois; Cole, Home Rule Use by Local Governments
in Illinois: Some Early Trends. (One of the background papers prepared
for the Illinois Assembly on Home Rule in 1973). See also MACK, supra

note 8, at 3.
See ILL.

REV. STAT.

ch. 46, §§ 28-4 (1973) where procedures have been

established for the conducting of referendums required by the new constitution in respect to units of local government.

The legislation specifically pro-

vides that such referenda may not be held more often than once
month period, and further provides that a municipality may not
referendum to cease to be a home rule unit until June 1, 1975 and
may conduct such a referendum only once within any 47 month
40 Committee Proposals, vol. VII at 1629.
411d.
42 Id. at 1868.
43 Id. at 1872-73.
44 PARKHURST, Article VII, supra note 7, at 99.

in any 23
conduct a
thereafter
period.
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figures of 20,000;15 30,000;"; 40,00017 and 200,000 ' were made
and rejected. Although the figure of 10,000 was approved on
first reading,", it was later amended to 25,000,"0 which was the
figure approved for the final version of the constitution. In
view of the more extreme problems facing larger municipalities,

particularly the City of Chicago, Delegate Peter Tomei went so
far as to propose that municipalities over 50,000 in population
be placed in a separate home rule category, enjoying greater
protection from legislative limitation than that afforded to
smaller home rule units (i.e., a three-fifths majority would be
needed to limit any exercise of home rule authority by such
5
larger municipalities). His approval was also defeated. 1
Despite the wide divergence of opinion as to a suitable classification figure for the automatic grant of home rule authority,
the delegates to the Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention settled upon a population figure of 25,000, thereby indicating the
spirit of compromise which led to a politically acceptable constitution.
GENERAL AND SPECIFIC GRANTS OF

HOME RULE AUTHORITY

When the delegates to the convention endeavored to define
the terms "municipal affairs" or "local concerns" in a manner
which sought to avoid the imposition of unreasonable restrictions on local authority, they addressed themselves to perhaps
the most difficult and perplexing problem which has confronted
the proponents of home rule.2 As Professor Sandelow noted:
For better or worse, the use of such phrases constitutes a clear
invitation to policy making by judges before whom, in our system
of government, all questions as to whether
a municipality has
5
exceeded its power must inevitably come. 3
Although article VII, section 6 (a) does contain similar
language entrusting home rule units with broad authority to
4 Verbatim Transcripts, vol. IV at 3325.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48

Id. at 3080.

Id. at 3324.
50 Verbatim Transcripts, vol. V at 4167.
51 Id., vol. IV at 3355-56.
52 Supra note 30, at 59.
Professor Cohn expressed the problem well when he stated:
Although the reason most frequently offered for this failure to effect
desired local autonomy is judicial unenlightenment and conservatism,
as exemplified in the adoption of the Dillon Rule of state supremacy
and in a persistent insistence upon its current vitality, the reason most
nearly in accord with the facts is that the concept of home rule as an
instrumentality of allocating powers of municipal autonomy in matters
of "local concern" or "municipal affairs," has not been defined in terms
capable of precise translation and application.
COHN, Municipal Review Powers, supra note 4, at 30 [footnotes omitted].
53 SANDALOW, supra note 15, at 660 [footnotes omitted].
49
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"exercise any power and perform any function pertaining to its
government and affairs," the framers of the 1970 Illinois Constitution attempted to minimize the problem of judicial pre5 4
emption in a manner not duplicated in any other constitution.
The four most basic and essential powers which fall within the
general grant of authority - the powers to tax, license, incur
debt and general police powers - were inserted by the constitutional framers to guard against judicial preemption. 55 In view
of the long history of strict construction of local powers in Illinois, 56 the Local Government Committee felt that the specification
of the most important powers included within the general grant
of authority was necessary to avoid restrictive interpretation
57
and possible limitation by the courts.
Although each of the four specific powers might well be
protected from judicial limitation by the language of section
6 (a), construction of the general phrase "pertaining to its government and affairs" promises to plague Illinois home rule units as
it has local governments in virtually every other home rule state.
Notwithstanding the specific statement in the Local Government
Committee Report that the inclusion of the phrases "exercise
any power" and "perform any function" were "designed to be
the broadest possible description of the powers that the receiving
units of local government may exercise, "' 8 and despite the fact
that section 6 (m) requires a liberal construction of the powers
and functions of home rule units, informed commentators have
expressed strong misgivings about possible future treatment of
powers which fall outside the strict ambit of the four expressly
granted powers of section 6 (a).9 Professor Baum, for example,
54 Committee Proposals,vol. VII at 1621.

Parenthetically it should also

be observed at this time that the inclusion of sections 6(g), 6 (h) and 6(i) in
article VII as bulwarks against implied legislative preemption, is also totally
unique to Illinois.

See note 131 infra and accompanying text.

The Local Government Committee Report, in discussing the inclusion
of general and specific grants of home rule power, noted:
Together, these two parts of the paragraph are designed to insure that
the specified counties and cities receive directly under the constitution the
broadest possible range of powers to deal with problems facing them
and with demands that are made upon them by their residents and by
55

the greater society.

Committee Proposals, vol. VII at 1619.
56 See cases cited at note 14 supra.
57 Committee Proposals, vol. VII at 1622.
56 Id. at 1621.

59 The editors of the Newsletter on Home Rule have expressed fear that
the use of the term "pertaining to its government and affairs," in an effort
to restrict home rule powers to local subjects, may lead to an overly broad
assumption of preemptory powers by the General Assembly.

NEWSLETTER,

supra note. 38, No. 1, at 15.
Consistent with this observation is the prediction of Arthur C. Thorpe
that an interpretation of this term could well suffer the same fate as section 11-1-1 of the Illinois Municipal Code (ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 24 (1971)),
which seemed to contain the broad grant of power. to "pass and enforce all
necessary police ordinances," but which has been so reduced by judicial
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has observed, "[y]et these words threaten to produce significant
and largely unexpected limitations on the authority of home rule
counties and municipalities." 60 Baum bases this fearful prediction upon an analysis of the Local Government Report wherein
it is suggested that the government and affairs of a home rule
unit should be more narrowly defined, with more matters con6 1
sidered to be of state or national, rather than local concern.
If the examples cited in the report are followedr2 the mere fact
that long-standing state or federal regulations have governed a
certain activity will, by definition, cause that subject to be considered other than local in nature and consequently not within
the realm of home rule authority. 3 Professor Baum argues that
such an approach is inconsistent with the intent of home rule
and proposes that a broad and expansive construction should be
utilized in determining a local power. In Baum's view of home
rule, the courts should enter the picture only in the clearest cases
of oppression, injustice or interference by local ordinance with
4
vital state policies.
This author fully concurs with Professor Baum and is of
the firm opinion that an expansive approach in defining what is a
local function is essential to insure the implementation of a viable
home rule system in Illinois. Unfortunately, the Illinois Supreme
Court does not appear to share this same view; for in Bridgman
v. Korzen 5 the court unanimously determined that Cook County
did not possess: the home rule authority to alter a statutorily determined method of collecting real property taxes In Bridgman
the court reasoned that the collection of taxes on behalf of all taxing bodies in Cook County was not a function which pertained to
Cook County's government and affairs. This decision, described
by Professor Cohn as disturbing and failing to possess a very persuasive rationale,6 7 spells trouble for home rule units attempting
to exercise a power which fails to fall squarely within the ambit
of the four express powers of section 6 (a). Hopefully, this attitude will be reconsidered and liberalized when the question of
interpretation that it actually generates very little affirmative power. See
Thorpe, An Analysis of Anticipated Problems Under the Newo Home Rule
Article of the Illinois Constitution,50 ILL. MUN. REV. 4 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as THORPE].
6o BAUM, Part I, supra note 27, at 152.
61 Id. at 153.

Committee Proposals, vol. VII at 1652-57.
Part I, supra note 27, at 154.
64Id. at 142, 157.
65 54 Ill. 2d 74, 295 N.E.2d 9 (1972).
See notes 313-29 infra and
accompanying
text for a discussion of the case.
66
Id. at 78, 295 N.E.2d at 11.
67 Cohn, Judicial Decision Interpreting Illinois Constitutional Home
Rule Provisions at 10 (1973).
(One of the background papers prepared
for the Illinois Assembly on Home Rule) [hereinafter cited as COHN, Judicial Decisions].
62

63 BAUM,
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whether an activity is local in nature is again presented to the

court.
The result reached in Bridgman was predictable because of
the illusory nature of the term "local matter." Efforts to clearly
define the term did not escape the consideration of convention
members. Their conclusion seems to have been that a specific
definition of what constitutes a "local matter" was not possible
in view of the fact that the term is in a state of continuing flux,
with matters of genuine local concern today being of statewide
concern tomorrow. 6 Realizing the possibility that the courts
might attempt to limit home rule authority with strict and restrictive definitions of local power, it was determined that at
least the four most important functions should be protected from
judicial erosion with their specific inclusion in section 6 (a).19
Taxation
The home rule power to tax coupled with the power to incur
indebtedness were viewed as the most controversial and most
important of any of the home rule powers.7 0 As the Local
Government Committee noted in its majority report:
The Committee believes that [these powers] are essential if home
rule is to enable counties and municipalities to perform the functions demanded of them in this increasingly complex and urbanized
world. In the simplest terms, urban areas need more money if
71
they are to survive and grow.

68 Verbatim Transcripts, vol. IV at 3056.

Perhaps the conclusion that their task of definition was impossible
explained why the question was not controversial, with even the strongest
proponents of home rule not objecting to the inclusion of the general language. BAUM, Part I, supra note 27, at 152.
61 In initially discussing the proposed section 6(a) Delegate Woods

observed:
Now, you see, we have combined a broad general grant with a
specific grant of powers; and the lawyers for the Commission on Urban
Area Government told us that, in general, they felt that was good.
They felt that this was a blending of general language with specific
delegation in the four most important areas, so that even if we had
adverse judicial interpretation of this article, we would still be retaining
the most basic home rule power.
Verbatim Transcripts, vol. IV at 3039-40.
70 Committee Proposals, vol. VII at 1625; see also BAUM, Home Rule,
supra note 6, at 822.
11Committee Proposals, vol. VII at 1625.
The position that adequate revenue powers are essential to effectuate
home rule is universally concurred with by the prominent home rule analysts. Professor Baum, for example, has described the home rule power
to tax as "crucial" power. BAUM, Part I, supra note 27, at 141. He later
observed that the view is widely accepted that financial resources are the
key to successful home rule. Baum, A Tentative Survey of Illinois Home
Rule (Part II); Legislative Control, Transition Problems and Intergovernmental Conflict, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 559, 564 [hereinafter cited as BAUM,
Part II].
The importance of revenue authority within the context of home rule
was perhaps stated even more forcefully by Delegate Wenum in response
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Because of the essential nature of the power to tax, it was
not only specifically included as a home rule power in section
6(a), but was also given a unique protection from legislative
limitation with the adoption of section 6 (g), prohibiting the
denial or limitation of taxing power except by a vote of threefifths of the members elected to each house.72
The limitations imposed by section 6(e) require the approval of the General Assembly before a home rule unit can
license for revenue or impose taxes upon or measured by income or earnings or upon occupations.-" But, except for this
specific limitation, it was intended that the home rule power to
tax should be given a liberal and expansive interpretation.7 4 The
constitutional delegates often stated their concern that this essential taxing power be free from the erosion that has been
experienced in virtually every other home rule state. The Local
Government Committee, for instance, included the following
observation by Professor Cohn in its report:
[I]t is evident that constitutional home rule provisions have been
largely unsuccessful in securing revenue autonomy for municipalito a fellow delegate inquiring about the necessity for the specific mention of
the power to tax in the constitution:
Because this is such . . . an overriding concern for meaningful home

rule to be implemented. Lacking revenue sources - lacking a protection
of revenue resources - home rule, which presupposes in most instances
that there will be a greater level of action, more functions, more
services than probably were, the case before, there is only one way
that the higher level of functions and services can be supported and
that is by having some additional revenue powers.
REC. OF PROC., SIXTH ILL. CONST. CONV., Verbatim Transcripts, vol. IV at
3060 (1969-70).
It has also been observed that without revenue the broad powers
granted by section 6(a) have a "hollow ring." Comment, Home Rule Identical Tax Levied by Illinois Home Rule County and by Municipalities
Creates No Conflict, 4 LOYOLA U. L.J. 479, 484 (1973).
See also note 30 supra at 47; PARKHURST, Article VII, supra note 7,
at 100; Banovetz, Issues for the Illinois Constitutional Convention: Urban
Problems at 13 (1968).
(The Banovetz paper was one of a series of papers
prepared by the Constitutional Research Group for the delegates of the
Illinois Constitutional Convention).
72 See notes 134-40 infra and accompanying text.
73 See notes 187-89 infra and accompanying text.

74 Chairman Parkhurst expressed this intent quite explicitly and forcefullt when he observed during the constitutional debates:
When you talk about home rule powers, you're talking not just about
property tax rates, sales tax increases, and gas tax increases -

every-

thing else except what is specifically limited by Section 4 [now section
6(e)J - every other conceivable tax except that which is specifically
limited by Section 4 [now section 6 (e) ] which basically is the income tax
and licensing for revenue possibilities ....

You're talking about literally

hundreds of tax opportunities, and the committee came right to grips
with the problem. If you want home rule and if you want local autonomy, you've got to give them money. That was our conclusion, and
specifically, you've got to give them the right to tax authority across the
board with anything they can think of - hotel rooms or airplanes or
motorcars or sales or gasoline or anything that the fertile mind of man
can think of; and that's why this is the broadest home rule grant in
any state in the country, and none of those taxing powers under this
majority proposal and the minority - none of them can be taken away
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ties. This conclusion is virtually unanimous among informed
75
analysts of the subject.

At the present time it appears that the home rule power
to tax is enjoying a healthy infancy. No legislation has been enacted to limit its effect 76 and Illinois Supreme Court rulings considering the issues have been favorable. 77 Furthermore, there has
been a great deal of enlightened effort toward listing the taxes
78
acceptable under the new constitution.
Despite the broad nature of this home rule power, several
commentators have criticized the extent of the taxing authority
as being inadequate for the needs of home rule governments.
The influential Illinois Assembly on Home Rule, for instance, has
concluded:
The assembly also realizes, however, that the added taxing powers
granted home rule units are not necessarily adequate to their needs.
Moreover, the taxing powers of home rule units, and indeed of all
local governments, must be related to the total fiscal structure of
the state, because it is the state government
which can utilize more
79
broadly based and equitable taxes.

A similar view has been expressed in an even more forceful
manner by University of Illinois Economics Professor Robert U.
unless you get a three-fifths' vote in the General Assembly.
Verbatim Transcripts, vol. IV at 3043. See also, PARKHURST, Article VII,
supra note 7, at 99, where he reiterates his opinion that the language in
section 6(a) is perhaps the broadest in the United States.
7 Committee Proposals, vol. VII at 1640, quoting COHN, Municipal
Review Powers, supra note 4, at 46. See also Sperling, Municipal Income
Taxation and Home Rule, I URB. LAW 281 (1969).
76 H. B. 4680, which was intended to impose a property tax freeze on
all property in Illinois, failed to obtain legislative approval during the 78th
Session of the General Assembly in 1973.
77In Bloom v. Korshak, 52 Ill. 2d 56, 284 N.E.2d 257 (1972), (to be
discussed at length later, see notes beginning at 255 infra) the City of
Chicago cigarette tax was upheld against the contention that said tax was
violative of the provisions of section 6 (e) prohibiting taxes upon occupations.
In Jacobs v. City of Chicago, 53 Ill. 2d 421, 227 N.E.2d 401 (1972)
(see notes beginning at 271 infra) the supreme court rejected the
argument that the Chicago Parking Tax ordinance constituted a license
for revenue prohibited by section 6(e) without legislative authorization.
The decision in Rozner v. Korshak, Ill. S. Ct. No. 45689, ___ Ill. 2d -----N.E.2d --- (1973) (see notes beginning at 277 infra and accompanying
text) affirmed the constitutionality of the City of Chicago Wheel Tax
Ordinance against the claim that the tax actually constituted a licensg for
revenue.
The case of the City of Evanston v. The County of Cook, 53 Ill. 2d 312,
291 N.E.2d 823 (1973) (see notes beginning at 330 infra), although involving the question of whether the same type of tax imposed by a home
rule municipality can create a conflict with a home rule county tax within
the meaning of section 6(c), nevertheless reiterated that all home rule
units, whether counties or municipalities, possess the "broad" power to tax
under the provisions of section 6(a).
78 Perhaps the most extensive study has been undertaken by the Chicago
Home Rule Commission which issued its report wherein twenty-five different
taxes are presented as valid exercises of the home rule power to tax. (See
The Chicago Home Commission Report and Recommendations at 382-482
(Decemb6r 4, 1972)..
79 See Report of the Illinois Assembly on Home Rule, summarized in
approved form in NEWSLETTER, supra note 38, No. 3, at 2 (1973).
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Schoeplein. HIe observed that the "explicit, stringent" limitationss of section 6 (e), which prohibit licensing for revenue or
taxes upon incomes, earnings or occupations without legislative
approval, preclude broad-based taxes related to income. Power
to tax in this fashion alone could provide tax revenues sufficient
to meet the increasing needs of local governments.-' Professor
Schoeplein pointed out that without this power local officials
could be hamstrung to the extent that they may have to appeal to the General Assembly for fiscal relief.S
Yet the fact remains that the home rule section does confer
significant taxing authority upon home rule units, at least with
regard to consumer taxes and other permissible excise taxes."
In their efforts to solve revenue problems through the utilization
of the home rule power to tax, local governmental officials have
received significant assistance from both an excellent study of
the home rule taxing power84 and favorable opinions rendered
by the Illinois Supreme Court regarding this taxing authority.
Debt
The rationale for including the power to incur indebtedness
as a specific home rule power in section 6 (a) was coincident with
that underlying the inclusion of the power to tax, i.e., that governments at the local level must have sufficient financial resources
to carry on their essential activities .1 Indeed, these two powers
were discussed simultaneously by the majority of the Local
Government Committee in arguing for their specific inclusion as
7
home rule powers.
However, the ultimate control over these two powers is
quite different in scope. While no limitation of any kind can
80 Schoeplein, Home Rule and Local Government Finance: An Economist's Perspective, at 8 (1973).
(One of the background papers prepared
for the Illinois Assembly on Home Rule) [hereinafter cited as SCHOEPLEIN].
81 Id. at 11.
In a similar vein, Lee Schwartz, an advisor to the Chicago Home Rule
Commission, has observed that the most productive new taxes would be on
economic activities measured by gross receipts, but such revenue measures
would require legislative approval because of section 6(e). Local Government Law Newsletter, vol. X at 3 (Feb. 1973) (Published by the Illinois

State Bar Association).

Professor J. Nelson Young has also noted that, although home rule

units can utilize their self-executing revenue powers to help alleviate their

fiscal needs, any major and substantial federal relief must come from state
revenue-sharing, particularly the state-imposed income tax. Young, Home
Rule and Local Government Finance: A Legal Perspective, at 13 (1973).

(One of the background papers prepared for the Illinois Assembly on Home
Rule) [hereinafter cited as YOUNGJ.
82 SCHOEPLEIN, supra note 80, at 14.
8a YOUNG,

supra note 81, at 10.

84 Note 78 supra.
85Note 77 supra.
86
8

Committee Proposals, vol. VII at 1626.
Id. at 1625-28.
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be legislatively imposed upon the power to tax, without the approval of three-fifths of both houses of the General Assembly
under section 6(g)," constitutional limitations have been placed
upon the debt power by the adoption of sections 6 (j) and
6 (k). Although both sections will be discussed more fully later
in this article,," it might be noted now that the General Assembly
possesses the constitutional authority to limit by mere majority
vote the amount of debt which home rule units can incur. 0°
Additionally, the legislature can control the home rule municipal
debt payable either from ad valorem property tax receipts or
from some other source. Regarding the former, the General
Assembly has the authority to require referendum approval and
impose limitations of debt to be incurred in excess of certain percentages of the assessed value of its taxable property. These
percentages vary according to the population of the municipality
(an aggregate of three percent for municipalities with a population of 500,000 or more; one percent if the population is between 25,000 and 500,000; and one-half percent if the home rule
municipality has less than 25,000 in population).o' The General
Assembly may also totally limit, by a three-fifths vote of both
houses, the amount of debt payable from other than ad valorem
92
property tax receipts.
This apparent inconsistency with the relative freedom from
legislative controls afforded to the home rule taxing power is
again due to the need for compromise. As the Local Government
Committee observed:
Paragraph 4.6 [now article VII, section 6(k)] reflects a compromise between those members of the Local Government Committee
who would have the Constitution or the General Assembly regulate
the amounts and methods of authorization of all local debt and
those who, under a home-rule philosophy,
would leave this power
3
with the local governing body.
Despite the potential for placing limitations upon the local
power to incur debt, the grant of this power nevertheless represents a significant departure from the prior legislative restrictions which required referendum approval of all local bond
issues.9 4 In Kanellos v. County of Cook, 95 the Illinois Supreme
88 ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(g) (1970), see also notes 135-40 infra and
accompanying text.
89 See notes 191-216 infra and accompanying text.
90 ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(j) (1970).
The supreme court has also
ruled in Kanellos v. County of Cook, 53 Ill. 2d 161, 290 N.E.2d 240 (1972)

that the General Assembly can require referendum approval of home rule
county
indebtedness by a three-fifths vote of both houses of the legislature.
91
1d. at 6(k).
92Id. at 6(j).
93 Committee Proposals, vol. VII at 1677 (emphasis in original).
"9 See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 34, § 306 (1971).
95 See note 29 supra. For a more extensive discussion of the Kanellos
case, see notes beginning at 295 infra and accompanying text.
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Court held that prior referendum approval for the issuance of
$10,000,000 in general obligation bonds by a home rule county
was not required by section 6(j) of the home rule section.
Since the rendering of this opinion, several municipalities have
also exercised their newly granted power of issuing bonds without prior referendum approval.26 It is likely that this debt
power will be particularly useful to home rule counties as well
as home rule municipalities which possess a tax base substantial
enough to permit a significant amount of referendum-free debt
in fulfilling their long term capital needs. 7
Police Power
The Local Government Committee discussed only briefly the
basis for the specific inclusion of the power to regulate for the
public health, safety, morals and welfare as a home rule power
in section 6 (a). The committee simply stated that police power
was among the powers deemed most essential to the effective
functioning of local government."
In view of the statement by
the Local Government Committee that the provisions of section
6(a) are designed to ensure the "broadest possible range of
powers" 9 and the realization that section 6(m) mandates that
powers and functions of home rule units be given a liberal
construction, it is suggested that the home rule police power
has great potential for assisting local governments in protecting
the well-being of their citizens.
Licensing
The power to license granted by section 6 (a) is not unlimited in scope, but rather is subject to the restriction of section
6 (e) prohibiting licensing for revenue without legislative approval. The distinction between licensing for regulatory purposes (which is permitted by section 6 (a) if the amount of the
license fee is directly related to the cost of regulation), and
96 Oak Park has issued $4,000,000 in bonds for a new municipal building;
Wilmette, $1,900,000 for the construction of a new municipal building;
Glenview, $1,400,000 for the purchase of land for and construction of a new
police administration building. See NEWSLETTER, supra note 38, No. 2, at 5
(March, 1973). Additionally, Cook County exercised this home rule function
on two other occasions when its Board of Commissioners approved a
$5,000,000 bond issue on June 18, 1973 for the construction of improved jail
facilities and a $7,000,000 bond issue on September 17, 1973 to finance im-

rovements for the criminal court complex.

Finally, the City of Chicago

as proposed in its 1974 fiscal budget that bonds be issued in the sum of
$22,000,000 for the construction of new sewers and for $14,000,000 to
finance solid waste processing endeavors.
9 It is estimated that Chicago can incur up to $330 million in referendum-free debt. See PARKHURST, Article VII, supra note 7, at 101.
98 Committee Proposals, vol. VII at 1623.

19Id. at 1619.
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licensing for revenue purposes has been well-established in
Illinois law.100
The power to license was specifically included as a home
rule power in order to help insure compliance with local regulations through the threat of licensing revocation and as a means
of producing revenue to support local regulatory programs. 01'
Additionally, it was thought that dependence upon the General
Assembly, where local governments were often not empowered
to license important businesses, should be avoided. 10 Two possible areas of difficulty exist with regard to the
home rule licensing power. First, although the distinction between licensing for revenue and licensing for regulation might
be clearly defined,1' the actual application of these distinctions
is, according to Professor Baum, far from precise. He envisions

problems in attempting to determine whether license fees have

04
become so excessive as to be considered licensing for revenue.
Second, the power to license may cause controversy because of
the burden it may impose upon businesses employing salesmen
who might be required to be licensed by several home rule
units.t 0 5 Indeed, impact from the controversial nature of this

too The Supreme Court of Illinois, in discussing the difference between
licensing for regulation and licensing for revenue has stated:
A distinction has been drawn between ordinances enacted under a
municipal power to regulate where there is no power to tax, and those
enacted pursuant to an express power to tax. As to the regulatory

license it is settled that the amount of the fee must bear "some reasonable relation" to the cost of regulation.
Arends v. Police Pension Fund, 7 Ill. 2d 250, 253, 130 N.E.2d 517, 519
(1955) ; cf. Metropolitan Theatre Co. v. Chicago, 246 Ill. 20, 24, 92 N.E.
597, 599 (1910).
The hypothetical questions and answers in the Local Government
Report provide excellent concrete examples of the scope of the home rule
authority as envisioned by the committee. Specific reference is made in the
context of licensing to questions 9 and 10 where the distinctions between
licensing for revenue and regulation are described:
No. 9 - Home Rule City adopts an ordinance forbidding lawyers or
doctors to practice within the city without first obtaining a license by
paying a license of $500 per year. Since the licensing ordinance
has no regulatory purpose but is intended solely to raise revenue, it is
specifically forbidden by paragraph 4.5 [now section 6(e)].
No. 10 - Home Rule City adopts an ordinance forbidding anyone to
work as a television repairman within the city before obtaining a
license, the issuance of which is conditioned upon the meeting of certain
minimum standards and the payment of a substantial fee. The ordinance falls within the home rule powers granted in paragraph 3.1(a),
[now section 6(a)] but if the fee should exceed the reasonable regulatory expenses incurred by the city, then the fee would be forbidden
under paragraph 4.5 [now section 6(e)] because it would be serving
a revenue purpose.
Committee Proposals, vol. VII 1654-55.
01 Committee Proposals, vol. VII at 1623-24.
102 Id. at 1625, citing Ives v. City of Chicago, 30 Ill. 2d 582, 198 N.E.2d
518 (1964) where the City of Chicago was ruled to be unable to license
building contractors because of failure to obtain statutory authority.
103 See note 100, supra.

BAUM, Part I, supra note 27, at 144-45.
"-',Committee Proposals, vol. VII at 1625.

104
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power seems to have already been realized. Legislative action
has been taken to preclude all local governments, specifically
including home rule units, from the exercise of any regulatory
authority (including the licensing power) over thirty occupations among which are funeral directors, real estate brokers, barbers and detectives. 1°6 Although this statutory enactment is presently the subject of court challenge, 11 7 the action of the General
Assembly in approving this law lends support to the conclusion
that home rule licensing power might readily be subject to public
pressure seeking to eliminate local regulation.
THE REQUIREMENT THAT HOME RULE
POWERS BE LIBERALLY CONSTRUED

A significant aspect of the home rule provision is section
6(m) which requires that "powers and functions of home rule
units shall be construed liberally." The rationale for including
this constructional guidance, which is found in similar form in
other state constitutions,'" was well stated by the Local Government Committee:
[TIhe section makes clear that local powers are to be liberally
interpreted in line with the purposes of the Article. As explained
in the discussion of Section 3 [now article VII, section 6 - the
home rule section], strict and narrow interpretation of local
powers is traditional in Illinois but the "home-rule" provisions of
Section 3 attempt to reverse this tradition. An express statement
favoring liberal construction should be helpful in ensuring that
courts and public officials give full effect to the powers granted in
Section 3.109

In short, section 6 (m) was included to evidence an intent
that Dillon's Rule no longer applies to home rule units."' Consistent with this intent, it has been suggested that the courts,
as final arbiters of the conflict between matters of local and
state-wide concern, could ease the effect of this dilemma by

106ILL.

REV. STAT. ch. 127, §§ 9.01-9.03 (P.A. 77-1818, eft. Oct. 1, 1973).
The restrictive nature of this legislation is evidenced by the fact that
prior to the adoption of the new constitution, municipalities possessed the
statutory authority to regulate certain of these occupations. See Diamond,
A Municipal Lawyer Looks at Home Rule Power, Local Government Law
Newsletter, vol. X at 3 (Feb., 1973).
107 Two cases are presently being litigated with regard to this statute:

City of Evanston v. Department of Registration and Education of the State
of Illinois

(Cook County Circuit Court No. 72 L 7377)

challenging the

constitutionality of the statute; Johnson v. City of Urbana (Champaign
County Circuit Court No. 72 C 945) where an Urbana ordinance relating
to licensing real estate brokers has been challenged in light of P.A. 77-188.
105 EBEL, supra note 21, at 15, citing N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 7; Micii.
CONST. art. VII, § 34; and ALAS. CONST. art. X, § 1.

109 Committee Proposals, vol. VII at 1593-94.
This statement of purpose is consistent with the observation by Professor
Antieau that home rule constitutional grants are to be interpreted liberally.
ANTIEAU, supra note 3, at 103.
110 COLE, supra note 24, at 9.
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creating a rebuttable presumption which initially characterizes
a debatable activity as local in nature."'
Section 6(m) has thus far played an important role in
supporting the constitutionality of home rule legislation by local
governments. In Bloom v. Korshak1 '1 and City of Evanston v.
County of Cook"13 specific mention was made of the requirement
that section 6 (m) home rule powers be liberally construed. Furthermore, although the Illinois Supreme Court has not cited
section 6 (m) in upholding the home rule authority in other
decisions, the constitutional mandate to liberally construe home
rule powers has been presented by counsel in written and oral
argument in each home rule case. Consequently, the utilization
of section 6 (m) has been helpful in reminding the court of the
constitutional intent to grant broad and expansive home rule
powers to local governments in Illinois.
THE STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION
OF HOME RULE UNITS

Article VII, section 6(f) contains several provisions regarding the structure and organization of home rule counties and
municipalities. This subsection, which grants home rule units
the authority to structure and organize themselves, subject to
referendum or legislative limitations, provides as follows:
A home rule unit shall have the power subject to approval by referendum to adopt, alter or repeal a form of government provided by
law, except that the form of government of Cook County shall be
subject to the provisions of Section 3 of this Article. A home rule
municipality shall have the power to provide for its officers, their
manner of selection and terms of office only as approved by referendum or as otherwise authorized by law. A home rule county
shall have the power to provide for its officers, their manner of
selection and terms of office in the manner set forth in Section
4 of this Article.
A separate treatment of each of these provisions will aid
the reader in understanding these powers.
Power To Change the Form of Government
The first sentence of section 6(f) empowers all home rule
units, except Cook County, to adopt, alter or repeal, with referendum approval, any form of government provided by the
111 Note 30 supra at 64.
112 52 Ill. 2d 56, 59, 284 N.E.2d 257, 258. See note 255 and text infra.
11: 53 Ill. 2d 312, 316, 291 N.E.2d 823, 826 (1972), rehearing denied
Jan. 26, 1973. See notes beginning at' 330 infra and accompanying text
for a more extensive discussion of this case. See also People ex rel. City
of Salem v. McMackin, 53 Ill. 2d 347, 365, 291 N.E.2d 807, 818 (1972).
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However, this provision creates several
General Assembly."'
ambiguities.
Professor Vincent Vitullo suggests that the inclusion of the
word "alter" can fairly be considered to mean that home rule
units may be empowered to change the structure of their form of
government in a method not specifically contemplated by statute.11 5 This interpretation is questionable, however, in view of
the fact that the term "alter" was also included in the original
provision as proposed by the Local Government Committee.",
The committee report described the original provision as "empower[ing] counties and municipalities to adopt various differing forms of government which are provided by the General
Assembly, and thereby implies that the General Assembly should
provide alternative forms of government ...
""I
Additionally, although the basic intent of the provisions
is clear, 118 there is a problem in determining their scope of applicability. This difficulty results from the failure to specifically
define the meaning of the term "form of government." The
Local Government Committee Report observed that this term
not only contemplates various methods for the election of county
and municipal officials, but also embraces the relationship
between local legislative and executive authority. 119 Yet, as
Professor Baum has noted, through the years the General
Assembly has prescribed many matters of local concern other
than those merely involving the election of officials and the
defining of intra-governmental relationships. 12 0 If such other

matters are to be considered within the definition of the term
114 With regard to the statutorily approved forms of municipal government, see ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, §§ 3-11-1 to 3-11-30; H§ 4-1-1 to 4-10-1;
§§ 5-1-1 to 5-6; §§ 6-1-1 to 6-5-1 (1971).
115 VITULLO, supra note 12, at 90.
Professor Baum also suggests this same possibility of interpretation, but
dismisses it as unsound and contrary to the intent of the Constitutional
framers. See BAUM, Pwrt I, supra note 27, at 148-50.
116 Paragraph 4.3 as proposed by the Local Government Committee,
provided in relevant part:
Any unit of local general government may by referendum adopt, alter,
and repeal alternative forms of government provided by general law ....
Committee Proposals, vol. VII at 1665.
117

Id.

11SIn discussing the meaning of section

6(f), Professor Baum has

observed:
The intention here is to preserve for cities the existing system of relative
flexibility of statutory control of alternative forms of government the council-manager form, the aldermanic form, the commission form,
and so on - and extend that kind of statutory system to counties which
have not been very flexible up to this time.
BAUM, Home Rule Background, supra note 17, at 8. See also Committee
Proposals, vol. VII at 1665-67.
119 Id. at 1667.
120 Professor Baum specifically mentions the prohibition against local
officials holding dual office, the quorum requirements for the city council,
the vote required for city council enactment of ordinances and the voting
power of the mayor as matters relating to the procedural details of local
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"form of government," they thereby become subject to legislative and referendum control. As a result, the home rule
authority in this area would be severely limited and home rule
governments would be unduly restricted in the independent operation of governmental functions.
The authority of Cook County over its form of government
is controlled by both sections 3(a) and 3(c) of article VII.
Section 3 (a) basically empowers all counties, within limitations,
to fix the number of members of the county board. Section 3 (c)
makes specific reference to Cook County:
Members of the Cook County Board shall be elected from two
districts, Chicago and that part of Cook County outside Chicago,
unless (1) a different method of election is approved by a majority
of votes cast in each of the two districts in a county-wide referendum or (2) the Cook County Board by ordinance divides the County
into single member districts from which members of the County
Board resident in each district are elected. If a different method
of election is adopted pursuant to option (1) the method of election
may thereafter be altered only pursuant to option (2) or countywide referendum. A different method of election may be adopted
pursuant to option (2) only once and the method of election may
thereafter be altered only by county-wide referendum.
Cook County was singled out for special treatment because
of its disproportionate population as compared with every
other county in the state, 121 because this population disparity has
created political and operational problems unique to the County
of Cook. The basic intent of section 3(c) was to continue the
political system of checks and balances existing between the City
of Chicago and the suburban areas with regard to the determina22
tion of Cook County structure.
Power To Provide for Municipal Officers
The second provision encompassed within section 6(f) empowers home rule municipalities to determine the number, nature
and duties of their own officers, subject to referendum and/or
statutory control. However, an interpretative problem may also
arise with this provision if an action taken by a municipal authority pursuant to statutory authorization is challenged by a
subsequent referendum vote.
governments which are controlled by statute. See BAUM, Part I, supra
note 27, at 148-49.
121 The 1970 census figures indicate that 49.4 percent of the population
of Illinois resides in Cook County (5,492,369 of a total state-wide population
of 11,113,976).
See Counties and Incorporated Municipalities of Illinois,
published March 6, 1972 by the Office of the Illinois Secretary of State.
122 The Local Government Committee obviously recognized the political
realities of requiring referendum approval of both segments of the population of Cook County when it observed:
This provision recognizes that a county-wide referendum throughout the

entire county and not split between Chicago and the rest of the county

would not be politically acceptable.
Committee Proposals, vol. VII at 1699.
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Although no consideration of this potential problem is indicated by the language of the provision, the Local Government
Committee Report or the floor debates, Professor Baum suggests that the conflict should be resolved in favor of city authorities acting pursuant to statute. 12 3 He bases this preference
upon the conclusion that such an approach would provide greater
flexibility in the control of local offices. Furthermore, this view
is consistent with the general broad grant of home rule authority
which is not dependent upon referendum approval.1 2 4
This
author is of a differing opinion. The manifest intent of the voters
of a home rule governmental unit should be deemed to prevail
over the action of local officials taken pursuant to statute. The
essence of home rule is freedom of action at the local level.
Under Professor Baum's theory, however, the problem of legislative control sought to be avoided by home rule would
again be present, albeit by the action of municipal officials.
Furthermore, article VII, section 4(c) establishes a hierarchy
of authority with regard to county officers whereby constitutional county offices can be created or eliminated only by referendum. This classification of power would seem to lend support
to the conclusion that a decision by referendum should override
a contrary statutory provision pertaining to home rule municipal officials.
Power To Provide for County Officers
The final sentence of section 6(f) relates to the authority
which home rule counties possess with regard to their officials.
It requires that any determination be based upon the applicable
provisions of article VII, section 4, which state:
Section 4 (c) :
Each county shall elect a sheriff, county clerk and treasurer
and may elect or appoint a coroner, recorder, assessor, auditor and
such other officers as provided by law or by county ordinance.
Except as changed pursuant to this Section, elected county officers
shall be elected for terms of four years at general elections as provided by law. Any office may be created or eliminated and the
terms of office and manner of selection changed by county-wide
referendum. Offices other than sheriff, county clerk and treasurer
may be eliminated and the terms of office and manner of selection
changed by law. Offices other than sheriff, county clerk, treasurer,
coroner, recorder, assessor and auditor may be eliminated and the
terms of office and manner of selection changed by county ordinance.
Section 4 (d)
County officers shall have those duties, powers and functions
provided by law and those provided by county ordinance. County
BAUM, Part I, supra note 27, at 150.
124 Id.
123
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officers shall have the duties, powers or functions derived from
common law or historical precedent unless altered by law or county
ordinance.
A consideration of these sections was recently made by the
2
Illinois Supreme Court in People ex -el. Hanrahan v. Beck.1 5
In that case the court determined that Cook County had the
authority to supplant an existing statute by removing the statutorily granted function of county comptroller from the county
clerk and placing those functions in the hands of a comptroller
appointed by the county board. This action was sanctioned notwithstanding the provisions of section 4 (d), which seem to grant
counties the power to merely supplement the statutory authority given to their officials. Quoting the Kanellos 26 case,
the court held that a home rule county has the authority to
enact local legislation superseding a statute which antedates
the present constitution, thereby permitting the county to transfer the duties and functions of officials without pre-existing
legislative limitation.127
In short, it would appear that home rule counties enjoy
substantially more authority than home rule municipalities in
determining the functions of their officials. While home rule
counties possess the authority to effect a change in local functions, even by superseding statutes, home rule municipalities
must depend upon either referendum or statutory authority in order to alter the functions, powers and duties of their officials.
However, in view of the expansive ruling in the Beck case, it is
conceivable that the Illinois Supreme Court may also assign a
liberal interpretation to municipal home rule authority in this
regard, thereby permitting them to act in a self-executing
manner, similar to home rule counties.
LEGISLATIVE CONTROL OVER LOCAL AFFAIRS

The general grant of home rule authority found in section
6(a) is subject to the limiting language in that same prov,-ion,
"except as limited by this Section." Specific restrictions upon
the exercise of home rule powers are included in several of the
subsequent subsections which will be treated later in this article.
The original limiting provision drafted by the Local Government Committee was accepted by the constitutional convention in virtually unaltered form. In explaining this restriction
the committee commented upon the need for some residual
legislative control:
Even the most determined proponents of home-rule recognize that
People ex rel. Hanrahan v. Beck, 54 Ill.
2d 561,301 N.E.2d 281 (1973).
12653 I1. 2d 161, 290 N.E.2d 240 (1972).
127 54 Ill. 2d 561, 566, 301 N.E.2d 281, 283 (1973).
125
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many matters of concern to local governments shouid be left to the
determination of the state legislature ....
[T]he Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations has warned that for
a state to give broad grants of power to local governments without
reserving the right of legislative control, 'all kinds of problems
would arise out of a lack of responsibility and prudence
or from
128
placing local decisions above the general interest.'
Although the committee emphasized the need to preserve
legislative control over most, if not all, home rule subjects, the
members nevertheless stressed the need to avoid excessive
legislative limitations:
On the other hand, there is a great danger of undue legislative
restriction of home rule powers if the legislature is authorized to
act on all matters affecting local governments. As one commentator
has written, under such a system 'the cities are left to legislative
grace and good judgment. If the legislators wish to delimit seriously the powers of all home rule charter municipal corporations

they may do so.

..

129

The problem, therefore, was to achieve the "delicate balance''130 between local autonomy and state sovereignty. The difficulty in striking this balance involved harmonizing two principal factors: first, the desire to achieve maximum local authority in critical areas of concern, and second, the recognition
that in order to prevent abuse of local authority and treat
problems of statewide concern, the state had to maintain ultimate
authority.
The Local Government Committee attempted to meet these
concerns through the creation of a system unique to Illinois-l
and more specific than any other state constitution in its description of the relationship of authority between state and local
governments .1 2 - In relevant part the section provides:
6 (g) The General Assembly by a law approved by the vote of
three-fifths of the members elected to each house may deny or limit
the power to tax and any other power or function of a home rule
unit not exercised or performed by the State other than a power
or function specified in subsection (1) of this section.
6(h) The General Assembly may provide specifically by law
for the exclusive exercise by the State of any power or function
of a home rule unit other than a taxing power or a power or
function specified in subsection (1) of this section.
6(i) Home rule units may exercise and perform concurrently
128Committee Proposals, vol. VII at 1637-38 quoting A.C.I.R., State
Constitutional Statutory Restrictions upon the Structural, Functional and
Personnel Powers of Local Government 73 (1962). Professor Antieau has
noted that all home rule constitutional provisions contain some degree of
legislative control, whether expressly or inferentially. ANTIEAU, supra note
3, at 137.
129 Committee Proposals, vol. VII at 1638-39, quoting Bromage, Home
Rule - NML Model, 44 NAT. MUN. REv. 132, 133 (1955).
130 Verbatim Transcripts, vol. IV at 3326, quoting Delegate Wenum.
"' BAUM, Part II, supra note 71, at 653.
132 PARKHURST, Article VII, supra note 7, at 100.
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with the State any power or function of a home rule unit to the
extent that the General Assembly by law does not specifically
limit the concurrent exercise or specifically declare the State's
exercise to be exclusive.
Except for the provisions contained in section 6(l), 131 excluding legislative action with regard to special assessments and
special service districts, the above-quoted subsections clearly
indicate that the General Assembly has the authority to limit
any home rule activity. The vote needed to authorize legislative
action, however, depends upon the nature of the local power
affected and the intention of the General Assembly to exclusively
govern that area of activity. An analysis of this preemption
system will be made according to important subject headings.
Taxation
As noted earlier in the discussion of the home rule taxing
power, the power to tax was viewed as the most important
governmental power. 3 4 The realization of its essential nature
was also considered in fashioning the Illinois constitutional preemptive system. Observing that balancing local autonomy
against state sovereignty is perhaps most difficult when considering the question of taxation, the Local Government Committee
stated:
Home Rule is a mere skeleton without flesh and muscle if revenue
powers are lacking or can be taken away by the legislature. As
Dean Fordham has stated, 'Home rule powers are not very meaningful if there be not the means of financing their exercise. There
can hardly be any doubt about this. .

...

35

At the same time, however, the committee recognized that the
fear of permitting local autonomy over revenue matters has
resulted in precious little local revenue authority in other
36
states.
Drawing upon the experience of other home rule states
and realizing that effective operation of local government
requires adequate revenue, the members of the convention
determined that greater protection should be given from legislative control over taxation than had been given in other
states.', 7 Moreover, it was determined that a protection should
be afforded which would restrict legislative interference with
the power to tax to a greater extent than with any other home
rule power. The result was the enactment of section 6 (g), which
requires a three-fifths vote of both houses of the General
See notes 170-86 infra and accompanying text.
See note 70 supra.
"' Committee Proposals,vol. VII at 1639, quoting Fordham, Home Rule
- AMA Model, 44 NAT. MUN. REv. 137, 142 (1955).
136 Id. at 1640, quoting COHN, Municipal Review Powers, supra note 4,
at 46.
137 Id.
133
134
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Assembly before any denial or limitation can affect the home rule
power to tax. This provision, which has been aptly described
as perhaps the single most important part of the Illinois home
rule," 8 is, in the opinion of this author, the backbone of the
home rule section. As noted by Chairman Parkhurst, home
rule without money is meaningless. 139 Further, due to the close
division in the General Assembly between the democratic and
republican camps, the requirement of a sixty percent majority
of both houses to override the home rule taxing authority is
essential in order to guarantee that this most necessary power
will be limited only when the need is manifestly shown. The
importance of the three-fifths rule regarding taxation was
demonstrated when a bill designed to freeze local property taxes
for two years received majority approval in the House, but
failed to achieve the three-fifths majority needed to affect home
rule units. Failing in his attempt to extend coverage to home
rule units, the sponsor withdrew the bill.140 Restated, the threefifths rule represents a meaningful protection, which should
prove to be an effective bulwark against future legislative attempts to limit home rule taxing power.
Powers Other Than Taxation
The home rule section includes yet another "three-fifths
rule" relating to the authority of the General Assembly to deny
or limit home rule powers or functions. Section 6(g) provides
that if the power or function sought to be limited be one which
the state does not intend to exercise or perform, and if it not be
a power specified in section 6 (1)141 (which involves special assessment and special service authority), then the limitation can
be effected only by a three-fifths vote of both houses of the
General Assembly. However, where the state intends exclusively
to govern a certain area, section 6 (h) provides that the General
Assembly can assume control over the local function by a mere
majority vote of both houses, so long as the power or function
involved is not a taxing power or a power or function specified in
section 6 (1).
The rationale for this novel 142 treatment of local powers
according to whether the state intends to exercise those same
powers was stated well by Professor Baum:
The distinction between powers and functions exercised by
the state and those not so exercised is crucial. The basis for this
1,8 BAUM, Home Rule Background, note 17 supra, at 10.
19 PARKHURST, Article VII, supra note 7, at 100.
149 See BAUM, Part II, supra note 71, at 564.
"I
142

See notes 170-86 infra and accompanying text.
Committee Proposals, vol. VII at 1645.
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distinction is that where the state is acting on its own, its interests
are very strong.

Thus it should be able to prevent local govern-

ments from acting in conflicting ways or in ways that inefficiently
duplicate state programs .... 1Yet, the distinction between the "denial" and the "exercise"
of a power by the General Assembly, described as the key to
solving the preemption problem,14 has been criticized by Professor Baum for a lack of clarity in defining the terms. 4 5 He
is particularly critical of the language in the Local Government
Committee Report which appears to imply that the state can
express exclusivity by merely enacting procedural requirements
for local governments to follow. 46 Baum contends that the
language gives rise to the implication that almost any general
legislative act affecting local governments can be considered an
act of exclusivity, requiring a mere majority vote and thereby
rendering the three-fifths requirement of section 6(g) virtually
147
meaningless, except for home rule taxing powers.
However, this author is of the opinion that Professor Baum's
concern is somewhat misplaced. It should be noted that at the
time the Local Government Committee Report was written, its
proposals also included a "standards and procedures" clause.'4 8
In one of the few victories for the minority members of the
committee, the convention as a whole deleted that clause' 4 9 and
resisted two subsequent attempts to have it reinstated as part
of the home rule section. 15 0 The primary reason for the rejection
was that the proposal presented a legislative opportunity to control local functions by mere majority vote without the General
Assembly actually entering the field of endeavor itself.' 5'
Admittedly, the distinction between the exclusive and nonexclusive exercise of state powers may be difficult to ascertain
in many instances. Yet, this may not truly present a problem
if the constitutional intent demonstrated by the rejection of
the "standards and procedures" clause is realized and the re143 BAUM, Part II, supra note 71, at 569; see also Committee Proposals,
vol. VII at 1641-43.
144 Parkhurst, How the New Constitution Affects the Practice of Law:
The 1970 Illinois Constitution Affects Local Government, at 5-3 (1971).
(published by the Illinois Institute for Continuing Legal Education) [hereinafter cited as PARKHURST, How the Constitution Affects the Practice of Law].
15 BAUM, Part II, supra note 71, at 569-71; see also THORPE, supra
note 59, at 5.
146 Committee Proposals, vol. VII at 1644.
147 BAUM, Part II, supra note 71, at 570.
'48 Paragraph 3.2(d), as proposed by the majority of the Local Government Committee, provided:
The General Assembly may by general law provide standards and procedures for the exercise of powers and performance of functions granted
by paragraph 3.1(a) [now section 6(a)].
Committee Proposals, vol. VII at 1578.
149 See Verbatim Transcripts, vol. IV at 3118-19.
1Id.
'r'

vol. V at 4181, 4194.

Id. at 4179 (Delegate Stahl's comments).
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quirement of section 6(i) 15 that a presumption of concurrent
action be made in the absence of a specific statement of exclusivity by the General Assembly, is understood. In view of the
two factors, it is believed that Illinois courts will carefully scru-

tinize state action to insure that the state actually intends to
exclusively govern the field before permitting legislative limitation by a mere majority vote.
Presumptionof ConcurrentAction in the Absence of a
Specific Statement of Exclusivity
Article VII, section 6 (i) provides that home rule units may

exercise any home rule power or function concurrently with the
state to the extent that the General Assembly does not specifically
limit by statute the concurrent exercise or specifically declare the

state's exercise to be exclusive. Read in conjunction with sections
6(g) and 6 (h), this provision mandates that before a home rule

function can be considered to be denied or limited, a statement
of exclusivity is required in addition to the requisite majority,
be it three-fifths or mere majority. The obvious purpose of
this requirement is to insure that the General Assembly actually
intends to affect a local function. As the Local Government Committee noted:
The purpose of distinguishing between statutes which express
exclusively [sic] and those which do not is to minimize the area
where courts might have to struggle to find legislative intent.
It is a guideline to the courts that concurrent local action is to be
permitted unless a contrary legislative intent is expressed.1 53
In view of the problems experienced in many states with
implied legislative and judicial preemption, the requirement of
an express statement of exclusivity by the General Assembly
before legislation can be deemed to affect home rule powers is
an enlightened and reasonable method of assuring true legis-

lative intent.
1 Note 153 infra and accompanying text.
153 Committee Proposals, vol. VII, at 1645.

Professor Baum has analyzed the purpose of section 6(i) in a similar
fashion:
Unless local power is specifically excluded, section 6 (i) guarantees home
rule units the authority to act concurrently with the state. The purpose
and probable effect of these provisions is to eliminate or at least reduce
to a bare minimum the circumstances under which local home rule
powers are preempted by judicial interpretation of unexpressed legislative intention.
BAUM, Part H, supra note 71, at 571.
This requirement was recently emphasized in Rozner v. Korshak, 55
Ill. 2d 430, 303 N.E.2d 389 (1973) where the Illinois Supreme Court reiterated the need for an express statement of legislative intent to limit home
rule authority before a newly passed statute or amendment can be deemed
to have a restrictive effect. See text at note 277 infra.
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Implied Preemption
One of the major concerns of several of the members of the
Local Government Committee was the problem of implied preemption, i.e., the denial or limitation of a local power merely because state legislation has been passed relating to the same area of
activity. In essence, the courts imply a legislative intent to limit
local activity merely because of the passage of similar legislation.
This concern was succinctly stated by Vice-Chairman Carey:
"Preemption is the name of the game as far as home rule is
concerned."'
Carey and other minority members of the Local Government
Committee waged a determined but unsuccessful effort to apply
the protection of the "three-fifths" rule to every home rule function in the same fashion as it now applies to the taxing power.' ,
Though unsuccessful in this endeavor, Carey nevertheless was
able to forcefully articulate to the convention the problems other
states have experienced with implied preemption.ie He thereby
aided in the defeat of an amendment which would have permitted
the denial or limitation of any home rule power by a mere ma1
jority vote of both legislative chambers. 5 7
Consistent with Mr. Carey's comments, Chairman Parkhurst
stated that the clarification of the preemption problem is the key
to effective home rule ' - and further observed that whatever
success home rule has had in other states has been directly
related to the preemption interpretation by the courts.'
According to Parkhurst, most decisions considering the statelocal
supra note 20, at 5.
155 See Verbatim Transcripts, vol. IV at 3341-46.
1.56 In response to his prime adversary on the question of preemption
Carey stated:
Mr. Butler in his summation said that thirty states have chosen home
rule and only one or perhaps none didn't have a requirement for an
extraordinary majority and he wanted to know why Illinois should be
different.
I think it's a fair question and my answer is that Illinois must be
different if it is to have - really have - home rule because home rule
has not been effective in any state of the fifty states; and we will be the
first state to have successful home rule if we require the extraordinary
majority.
Verbatim Transcripts, vol. IV at 3089.
Carey then went on to discuss the way in which preemption by implication had adversely affected home rule in Texas, California and particularly
Ohio.
Id. at 3090-91.
With specific reference to the preemption problem in Ohio, see Glander
& Dewey, Municipal Taxation - A Study of the Preemptive Doctrine, 9
OHIO ST. L.J. 72 (1948) ; Glander, Analysis and Critique of State Preemption
of Municipal Excise and Income Taxes Under Ohio Home Rule, 21 OHIO ST.
L.J. 343 (1960).
157 See Verbatim Transcripts, vol. IV at 3328-41.
"s PARKHURST, How the Constitution Affects the Practice of Law, supra
note 144, at 5-3.
154 CAREY,

159 PARKHURST,

Local Government, supra note 28, at 12.
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conflict have unfortunately upheld the sovereign power of the
state, thereby emasculating the home rule concept. 160
It was in an effort to minimize or perhaps even eliminate
16 1
this problem that sections 6(g), (h) and (i) were drafted.
Utilizing provisions more precise and specific than those of any
other state constitution,16 - the framers created a preemption system intended to reduce judicial interpretation to a minimum. Indeed, if the preemption provisions are construed as intended, then
any limitations upon home rule action would be imposed by the
General Assembly, with the courts acting only in the most extremely arbitrary or oppressive cases caused by legislative inaction or oversight. 16 3 In short, when the question is posed whether a
function or power sought to be exercised is local in nature so as
to permit home rule action, a strong presumption should issue
in favor of the "local" alternative, which could be overcome
only in the most compelling circumstances. Although the Illinois
Supreme Court appears to have avoided an application of this
presumptive test in the Bridgman case,6 4 it is hoped that a
greater realization of the liberal view of home rule demonstrated
by the constitutional framers will, in the future, cause the court
to expand its view of what constitutes a "local" function and
thereby aid in the realization of truly effective home rule in
Illinois.
The Effect of Pre-existing Statutes
on Home Rule Authority
One of the most important questions affecting home rule is
whether the limitations imposed by statutes enacted prior to
the adoption of the 1970 Constitution may be considered to
place restrictions upon the exercise of home rule authority.
Despite the magnitude of the problem, the question received
only cursory attention by both the Local Government Committee
and the constitutional convention as a whole. Subsequent commentary regarding Illinois home rule as well as decisional statements by the Illinois Supreme Court indicate, however, that
pre-existing statutory limitations cannot restrict the activity
Id.
161 Professor Vitullo goes so far as to state that the effect of these sections is to eliminate the possibility of implied preemption as a doctrine
limiting the role of home rule action. VITULLO, supra note 12, at 91.
Although this position mirrors the intent of the framers of the new
constitution, the present author questions whether the possibility of preemption has, in fact, been eliminated, particularly in view of the unanimous decision declaring tax collection to be outside the ambit of home rule
authority as not pertaining to Cook County's government and affairs. See
text accompanying note 65 supra and notes beginning at 313 infra and
accompanying text for a discussion of the Bridgman case.
162 PARKHURST, Article VII, supra note 7, at 100.
163 See BAUM, Part I, supra note 27, at 157.
164 54 Ill. 2d 74, 295 N.E.2d 9 (1972).
160
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of home rule units absent affirmative action subsequent to the
adoption of the new constitution, pursuant to the provisions of
sections 6(g), h) or (i). As Professor Baum noted:
[T]he language of the home rule section suggests that only legislation enacted after the effective date of the constitution can
restrain home rule powers. Section 6(g) speaks of the General
Assembly denying or limiting any
rule unit by three-fifths vote. No
dinary sort is likely to take place
home rule powers actually exist ....

power or function of a home
legislative act of this extraornor to make any sense until
165

This same view has thrice been enunciated by the Illinois
Supreme Court in considering the effect of pre-existing statutes
upon attempts to exercise home rule authority:
We therefore hold that this statute is inapplicable as applied to a
home rule county. It was enacted prior to and not in anticipation
of the Constitution of 1970 which introduced the concepts of home
rule and the related limitation of Sections 6(g) and 6(h). Such
considerations were totally foreign in the contemplation of legislation adopted prior to the 1970 Constitution. The statute is there-

fore inconsistent with the provisions of Section 6(g) and the
1 66
Transition Schedule.

In view of this statement, it appears that trial court decisions
upholding limitations imposed by pre-existing statutes upon the
exercise of home rule authority were wrongly decided.167
Although pre-existing statutes cannot be considered to limit
165 BAUM, Part Ii,

supra note 71, at 578.

The Local Government Committee Report included a reference to the
problem of pre-existing statutory limitation with regard to home rule
taxation, with its hypothetical question and answer No. 20:
Home Rule City levies a property tax yielding an amount which
would exceed existing statutory limits on rates of municipal property
taxation. The levy is valid. The power to levy a property tax falls
within the home-rule powers granted by paragraph 3.1(a) [now section
6(a)] and the pre-existing statutory limitation is not effective to di-

minish this power. The General Assembly could impose new property
tax rate limitations only by enacting a new statute by a three-fifths
vote of each house under paragraph 3.2 (a) [now section 6(g)].
Committee Proposals, vol. VII, at 1656-57.
166 Kanellos v. County of Cook, 53 Ill. 2d 161, 166-67, 290 N.E.2d 240,
243-45 (1972), quoted subsequently in People ex rel. Hanrahan v. Beck,
54 Ill. 2d 561, 565, 301 N.E.2d 281, 283 (1973). The "Transition Schedule"
referred to in the Kanellos quote is section 9 of the Transition Schedule of
the 1970 Constitution, which provides in relevant part:
The rights and duties of all public bodies shall remain as if this Constitution had not been adopted with the exception of such changes as
are contained in this Constitution. All laws, ordinances, regulations and
rules of court not contrary to or inconsistent with, the provisions of this
Constitution shall remain in force, until they shall expire by their own
limitation or shall be altered or repealed pursuant to this Constitution. ...

This same position was subsequently taken in Rozner v. Korshak, Ill.
S. Ct. No. 45689, 55 Ill. 2d 430, 434, 303 N.E.2d 389, 391 (1973) where Mr.
Justice Schaefer held that pre-existing statutes would "of course" be superseded by local legislation passed pursuant to home rule authority.
167 In
Peters v. City of Springfield, Sangamon County No. 210-72,
(appeal allowed directly to Illinois Supreme Court May 17, 1973; now supreme court docket No. 45766), the trial court held that the city of Spring-
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the use of home rule powers, it does not follow that such statutes
were automatically abrogated when the new constitution and
its home rule provisions became effective on July 1, 1971. Instead, most experts believe that because of the provisions of the
Transition Schedule,"' prior statutes continue in effect until
supplanted by affirmative home rule action.' "
Exceptions to Legislative Control
Over Home Rule Functions
It is undisputed that the preemptive provisions, sections
6 (g), (h) and (i), were intended to indicate legislative authority
over all home rule powers or functions except those specified in
section 6 (1), which provides:
The General Assembly may not deny or limit the power of
home rule units (1) to make local improvements by special assessment and to exercise this power jointly with other counties and
municipalities, and other classes of units of local government
having that power on the effective date of this Constitution unless
that power is subsequently denied by law to any such other units
of local government or (2) to levy or impose additional taxes upon
areas within their boundaries in the manner provided by law for
the provision of special services to those areas and for the payment of debt incurred in order to provide those special services.
The inclusion of the special assessment power was intended
to be an extension of the authority which, under the 1870 Constitution, was granted only to cities, towns, villages 1. 7 and
field was without the home rule authority to reduce the mandatory retirement age for firemen as established by a statute existing prior to the new
constitution. Although recognizing the language in the Kanellos case
quote above, Circuit Judge J. Waldo Ackerman merely described that holding

as distinguishable, without explaining how the cases were different.

In Environmental Protection Agency v. McHugh Construction Company, 4 P.C.B. 511 (1972), the Illinois Pollution Control Board rejected
the claim of the City of Chicago that it was immune from the jurisdiction
of the Environmental Protection Agency because of its home rule powers.
In so rejecting, the board stated that the purpose of home rule is to confer
governmental authority on local governments and not to limit state authority. Consequently, the pre-existing pollution statute was deemed to be
effective without re-enactment subsequent to the effective date of the new
constitution.
168 See note 166 supra.
169 In this context, Louis

Ancel and Stuart H. Diamond have observed:
To exercise its new powers a municipality must take some affirmative
action. Thus, while a home rule municipality now, for the first time,
may license general contractors, that power will only spring to life
when a local ordinance so providing is passed. On the other hand,
even if a home rule municipality took no new action, its licensing of
restaurants, for example, would still be valid.
ANCEL & DIAMOND,

AND VILLAGE

1972-73).
See also

PROCEDURES AND PRACTICES OF ILLINOIS CITY COUNCILS

BOARDS
BAUM,

88 (Springfield, Illinois Municipal League, Rev. Ed.

Part II, supra note 71, at 576-77; Kratovil & Ziegweid,

Illinois Municipal Home Rule and Urban Land - A Test Run of the New
Constitution, 22 DEPAUL L. REv. 359, 365 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
KRATOVIL & ZIEGWEID].
170 ILL. CONST.

art. IV, § 9 (1870).
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drainage districts. 17 1 Because court decisions interpreting those

provisions had determined that counties and townships could
not be authorized by statute to levy special assessments' 7 2 the
Local Government Committee proposed to vest special assessment
powers in all units of general local government. Not only were
home rule counties included as such units of government in section 6 (1), but all non-home rule counties and municipalities were
also empowered by article VII, section 7(1), to make local improvements by special assessment.' Furthermore, the committee
intended to alter the judicial restriction placed upon special
assessment power under the 1870 Constitution which limited a
local improvement to one unit of government,'74 by specifically
permitting the joint exercise of special assessment powers by
two or more governmental units.
The grant of the power to levy taxes upon certain areas
within a home rule unit for the maintenance of special services,
such as sewage treatment and fire protection, 7 5 was intended to
be a total departure from the uniformity requirements contained
17
in the 1870 ConstitutionY.

The inclusion of this new provision

was viewed as a method of introducing further flexibility in
governmental activity, particularly regarding counties in their
unincorporated areas. This provision also 77sought to stem the
proliferation of special districts in Illinois.

Section 6(l) provides the highest degree of constitutional
171Id.

§ 31 (1870).

See People ex rel. N.C. Van Slooten v. The Bd. of Comm'rs of Cook
County, et al., 221 Ill. 493, 77 N.E. 914 (1906) ; Comm. of Local Improvements of the Town of Algonquin v. Objectors to the Assessment, 39 Ill.
2d 255, 234 N.E.2d 778 (1968).
173 The Local Government Committee explained the inclusion of all
counties as recipients of the power to levy special assessments in the following manner:
The Committee believes that there is no reason why special assessments
should not be employed in unincorporated territories of the state, and
that the county, as the largest and most fully organized governmental
unit affecting unincorporated areas, is the proper unit of government
to exercise this power.
Committee
Proposals, vol. VII at 1660.
74
'
See Loeffler v. City of Chicago, 246 Ill. 43, 92 N.E. 586 (1910).
17 Verbatim Transcripts, vol. V at 4247.
:176 The constitution basically required that all taxes imposed by a
taxing authority had to be uniform with respect to the persons and property
within its jurisdiction. ILL. CONST. art. IX, §§ 9-10 (1870).
177 The Local Government Committee, in commenting upon the need to
remove the limitations of the uniformity requirement, observed:
Deletion of the uniformity requirement and addition of the proposed
provision permitting differential taxation will be most significant to
counties operating in their unincorporated areas. At the present time,
as noted by the Commission on Urban Area Government, the uniformity
clause is "deterrent to counties providing public services to the unincorporated areas where much of the current urban growth in Illinois
is occurring." . . . Because of this deterrent effect, the Uniformity
Clause is also an important reason for the proliferation of special districts in this state.
Committee Proposals, vol. VII at 1663. The proposal made reference to the
172
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protection17 to the special assessment and special service authority by the inclusion of the language, "The General Assembly shall not deny or limit the power of home rule units to .. .
However, the basis for this absolute limitation upon legislative
interference has been described as "mysterious" in origin,7 9
having been added on third reading with little explanation for

its inclusion. 1 0
Adding to the problem of analysis is the troublesome phrase
in section 6(l), "in the manner provided by law," which is included with reference to the special service taxes. In light of the
supreme court's recent decision in Oak Park Federal Savings
and Loan Association v. The Village of Oak Park,181 Professor

Vitullo was apparently correct in predicting that this phrase
would tend to dilute the initial prohibition against legislative
interference - "The General Assembly may not deny or limit
...."
In a decision marred by the strongly worded dissent of

three justices, the court held that the phrase "in the manner provided by law" mandates enabling legislation before special service
authority can be exercised by home rule units. 1 3 In so holding,
the court rejected the contention that the procedures already
8
established regarding other types of taxation could be utilized. 4
It is this author's opinion that the Oak Park case was
wrongly decided and constitutes a severely restrictive in-

terpretation of home rule authority. Hopefully, the court's
position will be modified when it renders its opinion in
Gilligan v. Korzen.'8 5 The Gilligan case brings into issue the
Commission on Urban Area Government, Policy Recommendations for
Modernization, issued in January of 1970.
It is essential to note that this concern for proliferation of special
districts was one of the basic reasons compelling the convention to adopt
a home rule structure. Indeed, the Local Government Committee in the
introduction to its report, observed that the large number of local governments has led to a "pattern of overlapping jurisdictions, pyramided taxing
powers, fragmented public services and divided responsibility" causing a
"complex and complicated tangle of governments at the local level." Committee Proposals, vol. VII at 1571.
Much has been written on the problem of the high number of special
districts and many statistics have been cited. For example, Illinois had,
in 1967, 6,453 local government units, which was 92.1 percent higher than
any other state and 296.9 percent higher than the average state. EBEL,
supra note 21, at 3. Illinois also has 2,313 special districts, which is also
more than any other state. COLE, supra note 24, at 3. In short, Illinois has
more governments (one for every 1,600 persons) than dentists (one for
every 1.800 persons).
KRATOVIL & ZIEGWEID, supra note 169, at 386.
17s See VITULLO, supra note 12, at 89.
179 BAUM,
180

BAUM,

Part II, supra note 71, at 562.
Home Rule Background, supra note 17, at 9.

supra note 12, at 89.
2d 200, 296 N.E.2d 344 (1973).
See notes beginning at 354
infra and accompanying text for a more extensive discussion of this case.
183 See notes 343-44 infra and accompanying text.
1s4 Id.
185 Gilligan v. Korzen, Ill. S. Ct. No. 45488.
18'

VITULLO,

1.0754 II.
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authority of Cook County under section 6 (1) to impose special
service taxes. Oral arguments were presented to the Illinois
Supreme Court on September 18, 1973, with the author representing Cook County. Since there was an obvious division of
opinion among the members of the court, with Mr. Justice
Schaefer (a member of the majority in the Oak Park case)
specifically stating that he did not feel that the Oak Park decision applied to the Gilligan question, it is hoped that a more
expansive view toward special service authority will be realized
when the Gilligan decision is rendered.
However, the problem caused by a lack of enabling legisla-.
tion recently became moot with the signing of two bills by Governor Walker which constitute the enabling enactments necessary
to permit the special service power to become effective. 186
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS UPON
HOME RULE AUTHORITY
The grant of home rule authority found in section 6(a) is
not absolute in scope, but rather is subject to the limitations
expressed in the remaining provisions of the home rule section.
An analysis of these limitations will be made according to the
home rule power affected.
Taxation and Licensing
Section 6(e) imposes several restrictions upon the power
to tax and the power to license granted by section 6(a). In
relevant part section 6 (e) provides:
A home rule unit shall have only the power that the General
Assembly may provide by law .... (2) to license for revenue or
impose taxes upon or measured by income or earnings or upon
occupations.
These several restrictions are directed toward the prevention
of both direct and indirect taxes upon income except with legislative approval. Once again, the spirit of compromise was
clearly evidenced at the convention, for the delegates were fully
aware of the public distaste for such taxes. This is particularly
true when it is imposed in the form of a payroll tax by the
municipality in which the employee works but does not reside. 18 7'
Thus, the decision requiring General Assembly approval of such
186 H.B. 369 approved September 21, 1973 as P.A. 78-893; H.B. 1359
also approved on September 21, 1973 as P.A. 78-901.
The City of Chicago has
187 See BAUM, Part I, supra note 27, at 145.
attempted to avoid the restriction of section 6(e) with the passage of the
Chicago Employer's Expense Tax Ordinance on December 21, 1973
(CHICAGO, ILL. MUN. CODE, § 200.3 (1973)) which imposes a tax on an
employer having more than 15 employees at the monthly rate of $3.00 per
employee.

19731

Home Ride in Illinois

289

a taxing scheme was perhaps the most important compromise
made by the Local Government Committee. 188
The restriction upon licensing for revenue was also designed
to avoid the imposition of an indirect tax on income or occupation. However, as was noted earlier,189 home rule units do
possess the authority to license for regulatory purposes, provided
that the proceeds from the license fees do not exceed the costs
of the regulation.
Debt
The power of home rule units to incur debt is subject to
general constitutional restrictions. The first limitation is imposed upon all home rule entities by section 6 (d), which provides
that a home rule unit does not have the power to incur debt
payable from ad valorem property tax receipts maturing more
than forty years from the time it is incurred. Although no
rationale for the forty year limitation is contained in the Local
Government Committee Report, the basis for its inclusion is
found in the debates wherein it was observed that it was intended that the twenty year limitation as established by the 1870
Constitution be extended so that the costs of public improvements,
which often last forty years or more, are shared by future generations who will have the benefits of their use. 190
Section 6 (j) imposes the following limitations with regard
to the home rule power to incur indebtedness:
The General Assembly may limit by law the amount of debt
which home rule counties may incur and may limit by law approved
by three-fifths of the members elected to each house the amount of
debt, other than debt payable from ad valorem property tax receipts, which home rule municipalities may incur.

The initial clause in section 6(j), which permits home rule
counties to incur debts payable from both ad valorem and nonad valorem property sources, presented a difficult problem of
interpretation for the Illinois Supreme Court in Kanellos v.
County of Cook."" Although the constitutional language merely
states that the General Assembly may limit the amount of debt
which can be incurred by counties, the version initially proposed
by the Local Government Committee additionally empowered
the legislature to require referendum approval, if desired.19 2 To
188 3AUM, Home Rule
189 See notes 100-107

Background, supra note 17, at 6.
supra.
190 See Verbatim Transcripts, vol. IV at 3219 citing ILL.
IX, § 12 (1870).

CONST.

art.

19153 Ill. 2d 161, 290 N.E.2d 240
192

(1972).
Paragraph 4.7 as proposed. by the Local Government Committee

concerned the restrictions on debt to be incurred by all governmental units
other than home rule municipalities:
The General Assembly may by general law limit the amount of debt
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complicate the matter, the debates are silent as to any reason
for the removal of the referendum requirement by the Committee
on Style, Drafting and Submission."-, The supreme court held
that since the language of section 6(j) was unambiguous, it
must be given effect.'"' However, the court also held that in the
future the General Assembly could impose a referendum requirement by a three-fifths vote of both houses. 11 5 At this
writing, no restrictive legislation has been enacted 1 6 and Cook
County has utilized power to issue $22,000,000 in referendumfree bonds. 7
Section 6(j) also entrusts a wide grant of authority to
home rule municipalities, for it permits such units to incur debt
payable from non-ad valorem property tax sources with the
maximum amount subject only to the difficult limitation of
three-fifths vote of both houses. Once again, the irregular
treatment of non-ad valorem municipal debt at the convention
prevents an entirely clear analysis of the subject. Similar to
the provisions of section 6(k) ,9" the Local Government Committee Report proposed limitations only upon debts payable from
ad valorem property sources. On first reading of this proposal,
no amendments were made by the convention as a whole. Only
after first reading, when home rule municipal debt was considered by the Committee on Style, Drafting and Submission, was
a provision included to cover debt payable from sources other than
ad valorem property receipts. 199 This provision was subsequently
adopted in substantially identical form as section 6 (j) of the
new constitution. The inclusion of this provision was apparently
made in an effort to express an intention that the general power
to incur debt found in section 6 (a) not be limited to debt
payable from ad valorem property tax receipts ;29) and furtherwhich other units of local government and school districts may incur.
Limits may vary according to functions performed and services provided. The General Assembly may require referendum approval of
such debt.
Committee Proposals, vol. VII at 1677.
193 Id. at 1989, 1991.
194 53 11. 2d 161, 164, 290 N.E.2d 240, 242.
195 Id. at 165, 290 N.E.2d at 243.
196 Three attempts were made in this legislative session to impose referendum requirements upon the issuance of bonds by home rule counties.

Two of the bills (S.B. 204 and S.B. 275) were tabled after first reading in
the Senate, but a more serious challenge was posed by a bill in the House
(H.B. 804) which was sponsored by over forty Republicans and which
failed to pass only after reaching third reading in the House.
197 See note 96 supra.

198 See paragraph 4.6 of the Local Government Article, Committee
Proposals, vol. VII at 1676.
199 See paragraph 8(h) as proposed by the Committee on Style, Drafting and Submission. Committee Proposals, vol. VII at 1989, 1991.
200 During the constitutional debates, Chairman Parkhurst commented

on the need for liberalization of the power to incur debt at the local level:
I think you might agree with me that some liberality -

some kind of
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more, since this was not a power exclusively belonging to the
General Assembly, its limitation or denial could only be accom201
plished by a three-fifths vote of both houses.
The underlying rationale of this provision appears to have
been the determination that percentage limitations based upon
assessed valuation of property were outmoded, ineffective and

costly methods of limiting statutory debt authority; and that,
in an industrial economy, property is neither the major source
of individual wealth nor an accurate measure of governmental
ability to raise revenue. 20 2 Additionally, the committee realized

that the elimination of personal property taxes2 0:' would ultimately reduce debt limits based on assessed value of property by
20 4
nearly twenty percent.
The removal of the requirement that municipal debt be
supported by a direct ad valorem property tax presents an excellent opportunity for innovation at the local level to create
novel methods of financing needed capital improvements and
thereby help to alleviate the heavy financial burden of underwriting general obligation bond issues, imposed primarily upon
20 5
property owners.
grant of power - in the area of capital improvements is just as
necessary as taxing power and maybe more so.
Now, one other point: This, of course, goes to the matter of ad
valorem property taxes, and I said when we started to present this
matter to you, friends and delegates, that we have conceived, I think
a system of capital improvements by deletion of certain sections of the
1870 Constitution, notably the deletion of the second phrase in the
present section 8 of Article IX, which says that every - every indebtedness must be supported by a direct annual tax on the property
in that district to pay it off. We have freed up local governments, I
believe, to find other ways to pay for capital improvements other than
the property tax source.
Verbatim Transcripts, vol. IV at 3378.
201 See Committee Proposals,vol. VII at 1991 for an explanation by the
Committee on Style, Drafting and Submission for the inclusion of a specific
section dealing with municipal home rule debt payable from non-ad valorem
property tax sources.
202 Id. at 1682-83.
203 The personal property tax structure was indeed altered in November,
1970 with the referendum approval of section IX-A of the 1870 Constitution
which established a prohibition against personal property taxation as to
individuals. Approximately a month later, December 15, 1970, the 1970
Illinois Constitution was also approved by a referendum vote. Article IX,
section 5(b) of that new document prohibited the reinstatement of personal
property taxes abolished on or before the effective date of the new constitution (i.e., as to individuals). Section 5(c) established the requirement that
the General Assembly abolish all ad valorem personal property taxes by
January 1, 1979, and concurrently, to replace all revenue lost by imposing
state-wide taxes, other than ad valorem real estate taxes, solely on those
classes relieved of the burden of the ad valorem personal property taxes.
The removal of the personal property tax as to individuals has resulted
in a series of complex and confusing decisions by both th$ Illinois Supreme
Court and United States Supreme Court, lending further support to the
decision permitting methods other than percentage of assessed valuation for
determining debt limitations for home rule municipalities.
204 Committee Proposals, vol. VII at 1683. See notes 207-16 infra.
205 See notes 207-16 infra and accompanying text.
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Section 6 (k) relates to municipal home rule debt payable
from ad valorem property tax receipts, and establishes a system
of referendum-free debt, on a scale determined by the population
of the home rule municipality:
The General Assembly may limit by law the amount and require referendum approval of debt to be incurred by home rule
municipalities, payable from ad valorem property tax receipts,
only in excess of the following percentages of the assessed value
of its taxable property: (1) if its population is 500,000 or more,
an aggregate of three percent; (2) if its population is more than
25,000 and less than 500,000, an aggregate of one percent; and
(3) if its population is 25,000 or less, an aggregate of one-half
percent. Indebtedness which is outstanding on the effective date
of this Constitution or which is thereafter approved by referendum or assumed from another unit of local government shall not
be included in the foregoing percentage amounts.
Once again, a conflict existed and this subsection represents
a compromise between two competing factions - those who
would have entrusted the regulation of local debt to the General
Assembly and those strong supporters of home rule who would
have left the power entirely in the hands of home rule govern20 6
ments.
The intention of this subsection was to permit home rule
municipalities to incur debt payable from property tax receipts
in amounts which range from the nominal (for small home rule
municipalities) to an estimated $330,000,000 (for the City of
Chicago) 207 without confronting the possibility of legislative
limitation or the requirement of referendum approval. The
maximum limit would be computed exclusively on the basis of
debt incurred after the effective date of the constitution. Furthermore, limitations on the amount of such debts, as well as a
referendum requirement, could be imposed only on amounts in
excess of those constitutionally specified. Significantly, the adoption of this provision constituted removal of the limitation found
in the 1870 Constitution which prohibited an indebtedness ex20 8
ceeding five percent of the taxable property in the taxing unit.
The 1870 limitation was one of the prime reasons underlying the
most extensive governmental fragmentation found in the United
States,20 9 and it inevitably resulted in a system of overlapping
206 See Verbatim Transcripts, vol. IV at 3377; PARKHURST, Article
VII, supra note 7, at 101.
207 PARKHURST, Article VII, supra note 7, at 101.
208 ILL. CONST. art IV § 12 (1870).
See Committee Proposals, vol. VII
at 1680-81.
209 EBEL, supra note 21, at 1; see note 177 supra for a discussion of the

facts involving the number of governmental units in Illinois which far
surpasses the total of any other state.
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taxing districts which inhibited the formation of a rational
2 10
overall taxing structure.
In addition to the undesirable nature of the existing tax
structure, another economic factor influenced the adoption of
section 6(k). In order to circumvent the five percent constitutional debt limits, which pertained only to general obligation
bonds of full-faith and credit bonds based on property tax
revenues, local governments began to rely heavily on revenue
bond financing, which was neither constitutionally nor legislatively limited, but which required higher interest rates and
longer maturities. 2 1'
As a consequence of the need to issue
revenue and other non-property bonds as oppose d to full-faith
and credit bonds, the total indebtedness incurred reached 9.04
percent of the assessed value of all property in Illinois, with this
figure running as high as twenty percent in the City of Springfield. 21 2 By the adoption of the municipal home rule debt
provisions, sections 6(j) and (k), it was hoped that the high
levels of indebtedness, which many citizens of Illinois have had
to shoulder, would be eased by the reduction of unwarranted
213
multiplicity and confusion in local financing.
A removal of the unlimited power to impose referendum requirements was effected by the constitutional framers because of
the historical realization that desirable bond issues have often
been defeated by a "tyranny of the minority," i.e., few voters
usually vote on debt referenda, and many of those who do, cast
their ballots against needed bond issues because of their disapproval of unrelated local expenditure policies. 214 As was
noted earlier, 215 several municipalities have taken advantage
of this opportunity to issue bonds without referendum approval.
It is hoped that future exercising of this power will be made in a
reasonable fashion with only obvious needs as the object of such
financihg, so as to permit the possibility of referendum free debt
in amounts exceeding the constitutional scale of section 6(k).
As one leading commentator has observed, the ultimate test of
a home rule unit is to impose upon itself reasonable restraints in
order to prevent undue legislative or judicial interference with
216
the fragile provisions of the constitution.
21o Committee Proposals, vol. VII at 1682.

Id. at 1678, 1681.
It was estimated, for example, that the total costs of interest payable
on revenue bonds exceed that of general obligation bonds by fifty percent.
Id. at 1682.
212 Id. at 1682.
211

213id. at 1681, 1682.
214 Id. at 1687.
215 See note 96 supra.
216 THORPE,

supra note 59, at 8.
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Police Power
Two constitutional limitations are imposed upon the general
grant of police power contained in section 6 (a)
Section 6 (d) provides in relevant part:
A home rule unit does not have the power . . . (2) to define
and provide for the punishment of a felony.
Section 6(e) includes the provision that:
A home rule unit shall have only the power that the General
Assembly may provide by law (1) to punish by imprisonment
for more than six months ....
The felony provision of section 6(d) was included to make
clear the intention that the punishment of major crimes remain
a matter of exclusive state control, the home rule section notwithstanding.217
The relevant portion of section 6(e), unlike section 6(a),
reserves to the General Assembly some measure of discretion by
empowering it to determine whether home rule units may increase the punishment for misdemeanors with sentences exceeding a six month jail term. 218
This latter provision was
added as an amendment during the floor debates, for there was
an expressed concern that a home rule unit could impose lengthy
jail sentences merely by classifying a crime as a misdemeanor
219
rather than a felony.
Conflicts Between Municipal Ordinances
and Home Rule County Ordinances
Article VII, section 6 (c) provides:
If a home rule county ordinance conflicts with an ordinance
of a municipality, the municipal ordinance shall prevail within
its jurisdiction.
This subsection, enacted pursuant to a general recognition
that municipalities are more important within the structure of
Illinois government than counties,2 20 unequivocally provides that
in the event of a conflict, the ordinances of all municipalities,
217 Committee Proposals, vol. VII at 1650; see also BAUM, Home Rule
Background, supra note 17, at 6.
218 With regard to misdemeanors, the present criminal code prohibits
any punishment exceeding one year in a jail other than a penitentiary.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1.7(f), 2-7 (1971).
219

Verbatim Transcripts, vol. IV at 3360.

53 IIl. 2d 312, 318, 291 N.E.2d 823, 828.
221 In justifying a determination that municipal ordinances should prevail over county home rule ordinances in cases of conflict, the Local Government Committee noted:
The preference thereby given to municipal legislation is based upon
practical and historical grounds. At this point in the development of
local government in Illinois, municipalities are by far the most important form of general-function government unit. Counties are relatively
weak, less organized and limited in authority. Although one purpose
of this Article is to strengthen county government so that it will become
220
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whether home rule or non-home rule, 22 1 will be deemed to prevail
over ordinances passed pursuant to a county's home rule authority.
However, this provision is applicable only when a conflict
arises as a result of the exercise of a home rule function by a
county. The Local Government Committee took pains to emphasize that section 6(c) does not mean that municipalities
can prevent home rule counties from performing their countywide functions, since such authority flows directly from statute
and not from home rule.2 2 2 Cited examples of such functions
included the county sheriff in the exercise of his law enforcement authority 223 and the functioning of home rule counties
as agencies for the state in dealing with subjects such as sewage
disposal and air pollution, which may require a broader treatment than can be provided by municipalities.224
A serious problem of interpretation arises, however, in
determining what constitutes a "conflict" within the definition
of section 6 (c), for no explanation of the term is provided either
in the wording of the constitution or in the Report of the Local
Government Committee, whose proposed paragraph 3.3 was
nearly identical to section 6 (c) .225 But there were extensive debates on the subject. Relying primarily on the words of Chairman Parkhurst during those debates, Professor Baum concluded
that the term "conflict" was intended to have an expansive definition, including not only situations of direct contradiction but also
instances where municipal legislation merely occupies the same
field as county legislation.226
This author differs with Professor Baum's conclusion for
several reasons. First, the language of Chairman Parkhurst as
cited by Baum 222 does not suggest that such an expansive
reading of the term "conflict" was intended. Second, one of
the criticisms leveled at the Local Government Article was that
a useful adjunct, and in some cases even a useful alternative to municipal government, we do not believe that the Constitution should permit
home rule counties to unilaterally assume the functions and powers of
municipalities which lie within the county's borders.
Committee Proposals, vol. VII at 1648.
222
223
224
225

Id. at 1649.
Id.

Id. at 1649-50.

Paragraph 3.3 as proposed by the Local

Government Committee

stated:
If a county ordinance adopted pursuant to paragraph 3.1(a) [now
section 6(a)] conflicts with a municipal ordinance within the corporate
limits of the municipality, the municipal ordinance shall prevail.
Committee Proposals, vol. VII at 1578.

Indeed the term "conflict" in the context of local-state relations in
other states has presented severe problems of interpretation. See SATO &
VAN ALSTYNE, infra note 254, at 257-59.
226 BAUM, Part II,
supra note 71, at 584-85.
227 Id. at 584, citing Verbatim Transcripts, vol. IV, at 3026, 3049, 3123.
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it did not deal with the difficulty of regionalism, i.e., situations
where the problem extends beyond municipal borders.2 2 8 Such
regional problems may not assume the proportion of statewide
concern which would preclude the exercise of county home rule
authority under section 6(a). However, Baum's interpretation
may well lead to a shackling of a home rule county's ability to
deal with problems impacting areas outside the municipality
which are also confronted with the same problem, because municipal action under section 6(c) could be employed to override
229
county action.
An example which readily comes to mind involves air
pollution .2 0
If a municipality has an air pollution ordinance,
then, according to Baum's theory, the county would be powerless
to act within the borders of that municipality pursuant to
county home rule power. This would be true notwithstanding
the fact that the municipal ordinance may be wholly inadequate
in scope to effectively combat the pollution problem or that the
municipality may be unwilling to enforce the ordinance. Such
a problem is readily possible with municipalities strongly dependent upon commercial and industrial residents to support
their tax base. Since the effects of pollution obviously extend
beyond municipal boundaries, it is suggested that the expansive
definition of the term "conflict" as proposed by Professor
Baum is ill-suited to the realities of urban existence. The
preferable approach may be to analyze the municipal ordinance together with the county home rule ordinance in order
to ascertain whether an irreconcilable dilemma is created in
attempting to comply with the terms of both ordinances. In
short, would compliance with the terms of either ordinance result
in a violation of the other? If such a dilemma has not been
created, then it is suggested that the theory of concurrent
authority, as established by section 6(i) for state/home rule
action, should apply as well in the home rule county/municipal
1
action context.23
Additionally, in the only decision thus far rendered con228NEWSLETTER,

supra note 38, No. 3, at 3

(May,

1973),

quoting

Norman Elkin.
229

Father Joseph Small has noted that the key factor toward the future

solution of metropolitan problems might well be a strong county government.
SMALL, supra note 13, at 10.
220 Cook County has been involved in pollution litigation wherein the
"conflict" provision was raised in an effort to preclude county enforcement
in these cases. See Village of Melrose Park v. County of Cook, Cook County
Circuit Court No. 72 L 7689; County of Cook v. Max Factor, Inc., Docket
Nos. Z00577, Z00591.
22: For example,
Arthur C. Thorpe has suggested that if a county
building code or licensing regulation be substantially similar to that of a
municipality, it would be enforceable in the municipality concurrently with
municipal regulations. See THORPE, supra note 59, at 5.
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struing section 6 (c), the Illinois Supreme Court appears to have
rejected Baum's mechanical approach. In City of Evanston v.
County of Cook,2 32 the supreme court, with three justices dissenting, ruled that identical taxing ordinances passed by Cook

County and six municipalities, did not create a conflict within
the meaning of section 6 (c). Rather, the court determined that
the case simply presented a situation where separate and distinct
units of local governments were exercising the power which
they possessed by virtue of article VII, section 6 (a) -to tax the
233
same transaction.
In short, the question of conflict between such local governmental entities is not easily resolved, and this author fully concurs with Professor Baum in his assessment that the "conflict"
dilemma will be the subject of much future judicial interpreta23
tion. 4
EXTRA-TERRITORIAL APPLICATION
OF HOME RULE AUTHORITY

Article VII, section 6 (a) permits home rule units, within
the limitations of that section, to "exercise any power and perform any function pertaining to its government and affairs."
Since this expansive grant of authority contains no territorial
limits upon the powers given to home rule units (which is an
essential change from the first draft of the section restricting
home rule authority to the corporate limits of the governmental
unit)2 35 the question is posed whether the adopted change was
53 Ill. 2d 312, 291 N.E.2d 823 (1973).
See text at note 330 infra.
Id. at 319, 291 N.E.2d at 826.
234 BAUM,
Part II, supra note 71, at 585.
It might also be noted parenthetically that the confusion and uncertainty resulting from this conflict doctrine is not nearly as pronounced
as the problems of conflict between other types of local governments,
where nothing is contained in the constitution to solve such problems. See
City of Des Plaines v. Metropolitan Sanitary District, 48 Ill. 2d 11, 268
N.E.2d 428 (1971), where the supreme court permitted the Sanitary District
to construct a water reclamation plant within the City of Des Plaines,
despite a clear conflict with the city's zoning ordinance; and O'Connor v.
City of Rockford, 52 Ill. 2d 360, 288 N.E.2d 432 (1972) where the supreme
court held that the City of Rockford could not construct and operate a
sanitary landfill in the unincorporated area outside its city limits, not
because it violated a Winnebago County zoning ordinance, but because this
was an environmental issue beyond the control of either Rockford or
Winnebago County and solely within the authority of the State Environmental Protection Agency.
235 Paragraph 3.1 (a) of the proposed Local Government Article as
submitted by the Local Government Committee provided:
Any county which has a chief executive officer elected by the voters
of the county and any municipality which has a population of more
than 20,000 may, within its corporate limits, exercise any power and
perform any function pertaining to its government and affairs, including, but not limited to, the power to regulate for the protection of the
public health, safety, morals, and welfare; to license; to tax; and to
incur debt.
Committee Proposals, vol. VII at 1577.
232
233
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intended to suggest extra-territorial applicability of home rule
authority.
Professor Baum has opined that the final draft appearing
in the new constitution represents no substantial change from
the territorial limitations originally imposed in the proposed
Local Government Article.2 11 The Illinois Supreme Court has apparently accepted a modified version of that theory.
In People ex rel. City of Salem v. McMackin 237 the supreme
court ruled, over a strongly worded dissent by Mr. Justice
Schaefer,238 that the constitutional grant of home rule authority
is of sufficient scope to permit home rule municipalities to pur.
However, the
chase land outside of their territorial limits. 39
court restricted its ruling to an approval of the extra-territorial
exercise of proprietary authority, specifically noting that the
question of the extra-territorial exercise2 40of sovereign authority
may well be beyond home rule authority.
This ruling seems to suggest the conclusion that the problem
of conflict arising under section 6(c) between a municipal and
a home rule county ordinance in areas outside the municipal
borders will be minimized. Although section 6(c) permits a
municipal ordinance to prevail within its jurisdiction when it
conflicts with a home rule county ordinance, it appears that the
term "within its jurisdiction" is not to be read any more broadly
in a home rule context than the interpretation given section 6 (a)
by the supreme court in the Salem case. Although the proposed
Local Government Article originally restricted the applicability
of the conflict provision to the corporate limits of the municipality involved, 2 41 certain members of the convention objected
to such a limitation; for their feeling was that its inclusion might
result in the removal of the extra-territorial jurisdiction given
to municipalities by statute. 242 The resulting deletion of the
BAUM, Pa'rt II, supra note 71, at 582.
See note and accompanying
53 Ill. 2d 347, 291 N.E.2d 807 (1972).
text beginning at note 376 infra for a more extensive discussion of this case.
238 Id. at 369-74, 291 N.E.2d at 820-23.
Justice Schaefer dissented on the theory that the power of a home rule
unit does not include the purchase of land outside its governmental limits.
239 Id.
at 365, 291 N.E.2d at 818.
240 Id.
at 365-66, 291 N.E.2d at 818.
241 Paragraph 3.3, as proposed by the Local Government
Committee,
provided:
If a county ordinance adopted pursuant to paragraph 3.1 (a) [now
article VII, section 6(a)] conflicts with a municipal ordinance within
the corporate limits of the municipality, the municipal ordinance shall
prevail.
Committee Proposals, vol. VII at 1578.
-"1 Chairman Parkhurst, speaking in support of an amendment by
Delegate Elward to remove the territorial limitation of paragraph 3.3,
stated:
Now what this says in the conflict situation is that the home rule
powers which can be exercised by a county under the provision here of
236

237
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territorial limitation was therefore based on a desire to preserve
extra-territorial control granted by statute to municipalities,
rather than to permit the broad exercise of home rule municipal powers beyond corporate borders. '- "
INTERGOVERNMENTAL COOPERATION

The home rule section of the new constitution has been
criticized for its failure to provide adequate methods by which
to deal with problems extending beyond the geographic limits
of the home rule unit.2- 44 However, this inadequacy has been

met, at least in part, with the inclusion in the 1970 Constitution
of one of the most far-reaching, self-executing intergovernmental
cooperation provisions in the county. This provision permits local
governments of all types to accomplish almost anything in concert, without specific legislative authority. - 1 Article VII, section
10(a) of the intergovernmental cooperation section provides:
Units of local government and school districts may contract
3.3 before us simply are pre-empted by the enactment of a municipal
ordinance within the county; and the Elward amendment says that
that municipal ordinance can drive away the home rule power of the
county within municipal limits, or outside the municipal limits if the
statute has given the municipality the right to have that extraterritorial
jurisdiction, as they have in the zoning situation.
Verbatim Transcripts, vol. IV at 3120 (emphasis added).
24.3 Parkhurst also observed during the debates on the conflict provision:
Now, what we were saying there - and I think, quite properly - was
that you can't exercise home rule powers extraterritorily, unless the
statute says you can. . . . You can't by - under home rule reach out
and scare everybody to death that you are going to incorporate somebody
or annex somebody or erect some kind of metropolitan government
under the guise of home rule by reaching outside your corporate limits.
Id.
244 Elkin, NEWSLETTER,
supra note 38, No. 3, at 4 (May, 1973).
The Local Government Committee, in presenting arguments against
home rule, included statements questioning the ability of the typical governmental unit to deal with many of the pressing urban problems. For
instance, the advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations was
quoted as saying:
Recent developments in metropolitan areas have divested the concept
of home rule of much of the sanctity it possessed at various times in
the past. The values of maximum citizen participation and local control
implicit in home rule are in tension with the limited ability of small
units of government to meet modern science standards, with the spread
of public policy concerns to the metropolitan scale, and with the poor
public performance that often results from divided authority. Effective local control - the goal of home rule advocates - often requires
a larger jurisdiction than the typical local unit in a metropolitan area.
Committee Proposals, vol. VII at 1611.
245 PARKHURST, Article VII, supra note 7, at 97.
Intergovernmental cooperating provisions are commonplace in the
United States, with all fifty states permitting such activity by statute.
Additionally, eight states have constitutional provisions for cooperative
activity among governments. See Committee Proposals, vol. VII at 1752.
In his paper prepared for use as the constitutional convention, Father
Small argued for the inclusion of a provision concerning intergovernmental
relations:
It may be argued that such an article is unnecessary, and it is inconceivable that cooperative service or governmental arrangements mutually
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or otherwise associate among themselves, with the State, with
other states and their units of local government and school districts, and with the United States to obtain or share services and
to exercise, combine, or transfer any power or function, in any
manner not prohibited by law or by ordinance. Units of local
government and school districts may contract and otherwise associate with individuals, associations, and corporations in any manner
not prohibited by law or by ordinance. Participating units of
government may use their credit, revenues, and other resources to
pay costs and to service debt related to intergovernmental activities.
Although intergovernmental cooperation was not prohibited
by the 1870 Constitution, the influence of the limiting theory of
Dillon's Rule led to the belief that specific statutory authorization
2
was needed before intergovernmental activity was possible. 46
The persistence of Judge Dillon's philosophy, coupled with the
existence of many statutory provisions limiting such activity,
led to the realization that a definitive statement on intergovernmental cooperation was necessary in the new constitution.2 4 7 The
result was the adoption of article VII, section 10, the purpose
of which was explained by the Local Government Committee:
The purpose of this proposed new section is to provide maximum flexibility to units of local government in working out
solutions to common problems in concert with other units of
government at all levels ....
Intergovernmental cooperation is a
workable alternative to the formation of larger units of government
by encouraging existing units of local government to innovate
solutions to common problems. It will afford the participating
units of local government the economies of scale which are only
available with size while preserving local autonomy. In some instances, intergovernmental cooperative agreements and contracts
will permit the initiation and administration of projects which no
single unit could undertake.
Expanded intergovernmental cooperation by general purpose local governments will eliminate, to
some extent; the need for new special purpose governments which
24
cross existing governmental boundaries. Despite the obvious advantages of the intergovernmental
cooperation section, it has been subjected to some criticism.
agreed to by local governments would be denied by the state government.
Yet as we become increasingly interdependent particularly in our metropolitan areas, and as we evolve new life styles beyond the imagination
of an earlier generation (and even beyond our present imagination) it
is important that a constitution that may govern the State of Illinois
for the next century should be worded so as to allow its citizens to
fashion local governmental structures and services that may come to be
recognized as needed by the new and more complex urban living.
SMALL, sup'a note 13, at 11.
246 Committee Proposals, vol. VII at 1750-51.
247 Id. at 1751.
248 Id. at 1747, 1751-52.
As was noted earlier in this article, the same concern for the proliferation of special districts which was evidenced with the adoption of the
intergovernmental cooperation section was a basic reason for the creation
of the home rule section. See note 177 supra.
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For example, David G. Heeter has complained that the brevity
of section 10 has resulted in a failure to touch upon some questions while conversely raising others.) ' " A specific inquiry has
surfaced, for example, as to the meaning of the phrase "in
any manner not prohibited by law or by ordinance," found in
the second sentence of the section. The Report of the Chicago
Home Rule Commission has noted that although the phrase
speaks in terms of legislative prohibition of intergovernmental
cooperation and not of legislative limitation, nevertheless a limitation could easily be drafted in prohibitory language. 2 .511 Furthermore, the second sentence of section 10(a) treats agreements with non-governmental entities and permits local governments and school districts to "contract and otherwise associate"
with such entities. Since the first sentence is phrased in broad
language (i.e., "may contract and otherwise associate . . . . to
obtain or share services and to exercise, combine or transfer
any power or function"), but the second sentence is phrased in
limiting language (i.e., "in any manner not prohibited by law or
by ordinance") the questions raised are whether the lack of
limiting language in the first sentence clearly constitutes a
broad grant of authority or whether the limiting language of
the second sentence confines the authority apparently granted in
the first sentence. The Chicago Home Rule Commission opined
that the language referring to activity with non-governmental
entities should be read in a narrow sense, but the report questions
whether the provision should be read with a strict and literal
interpretation, thereby ignoring the obvious necessity to obtain
services from non-governmental entities such as the sale and
25
purchase of pencils and paper. '
Despite the shortcomings in the language of the intergovernmental cooperation provision, it should be reiterated that the
section was clearly intended to be an expansive grant of authority
to governments so that they are able to work with one another
for the best interests of each entity.2 52 Should this intent be
considered by the courts and the General Assembly, then this
author fully concurs with the Chicago Home Rule Commission
that the intergovernmental cooperation section will play an increasingly important role in the effective implementation of
Govern249Heeter, Home Rule: Intergovernmental Cooperation ment by Contract at 15. (Second Annual Local Government Law Institute,
presented by the Illinois Institute for Continuing Legal Education (1971)).
250 The Chicago Home Rule Commission Report and Recommendation,
supra note 78, at 73.
251
25 2

Id. at 73-74.

See PARKHURST, Article VII, supra note 7, at 97.

302

The John Marshall Journal of Practice and Procedfre

fVol. 6:253

home rule authority,2-51 and will lead to greater local government
2 54
ability to combat problems of area-wide concern.
ILLINOIS JUDICIAL DECISIONS

CONCERNING HOME RULE

Several opinions have been rendered by the Illinois Supreme
Court, as well as trial courts throughout the state, interpreting
the provisions of the home rule section. Although all of the
supreme court decisions have been briefly considered throughout
this article, they are of such crucial importance in analyzing
home rule in Illinois that a more detailed discussion of each is
desirable.
25

Bloom v. Korshak

5

This initial Illinois case challenging the exercise of home rule
authority was later viewed as having a limited but significant
impact on the home rule issue.256 The plaintiffs in the two
consolidated class actions (Bloom v. Korshak, and Ryan v.
Korshak) attacked the constitutionality of the Chicago cigarette
2 7
tax ordinance.
The Ryan suit was brought on behalf of all persons who
purchased cigarettes in the City of Chicago. Plaintiffs contended
that article VII, section 6(e), which prohibits taxes imposed
upon or measured by income or earnings or upon occupations
without legislative approval, should be interpreted as excepting
any privilege or nonproperty taxes from the general grant of
home rule authority conferred by section 6 (a). 25
In speaking
for a unanimous court, Mr. Justice Ward rejected this restrictive
interpretation, emphasizing the mandate of section 6 (m) to liberally construe the powers of home rule units, and further stated
that it would be unreasonable to read limitations into section 6 (e)
beyond the plain words of that provision.25) To so interpret the
words of the section would be inconsistent with the "broad
authority" given to home rule units under section 6(a) and
would be contrary to the express intent of the constitutional
convention to permit taxing schemes such as those upon the sale
of cigarettes.'( °
253 The Chicago Home Rule Commission Report and Recommendations,
supra note 78, at 91.
254 Professors Sato and Van Alstyne have observed that today most of
the significant problems of local government are not of local concern alone,
but reach beyond artificial political boundary lines. See SATO & VAN
ALSTYNE, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW, at 221 (1970).
255 52 Ill. 2d 56, 284 N.E.2d 257 (1972).
256 COHN, Judicial Decisions, supra note 67, at 8.
257 CHICAGO, ILL. MUN. CODE § 178.1 (1972).
258 52 Ill. 2d at 59, 284 N.E.2d at 260.
259

Id.

260 Id.

See Committee Proposals, vol. VII at 1656.
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Plaintiffs also contended that if the restrictions of section
6 (e) were limited only to taxes on income, earnings or occupation, it followed that the due process and equal protection
standards of both the state and federal constitutions would be
violated because, while these nonproperty or privilege taxes
would be subject to prior legislative approval before imposition,
26
other home rule nonproperty or privilege taxes would not be. '
The court also differed with this contention, stating that there
was no constitutional intention to restrict classification of taxes
to property and nonproperty categories.2 62
Rather, the court
held that the limitations as established by a plain reading of
section 6(e) are reasonable and non-arbitrary in nature, with
26
no suggestion of non-uniform application. 1
Plaintiff's final claim in Ryan was that the provisions of
section 6(e) are contrary to article IX, section 2 of the 1.970
Constitution which requires that the classification of the objects
of nonproperty taxes shall be reasonable. The court deemed this
position to be without merit because article IX, section 2 speaks
to the treatment of the subjects or objects of taxes, whereas Ryan
was claiming that the types of taxes were being treated unequally. Since due process and equal protection are concepts
which protect only the rights of persons, they may not be invoked
2 4
to assail a classification of taxes. 6

Bloom took a different approach. Plaintiffs, who represented various classes of sellers and purchasers of cigarettes in
the City of Chicago, alleged the city ordinance was a tax on
occupations which requires prior legislative approval under
section 6 (e). This theory was based upon a claim that the legal
incidence of the tax falls upon either the wholesaler or retailer
who are required to purchase tax stamps from the city collector
before the cigarettes can be sold in Chicago, and to thereafter
remit the funds monthly to the city with an accompanying report.
Furthermore, the ordinance stated that any penalties for violations of the ordinance are imposed solely on the wholesaler or re265
tailer.
The Illinois Supreme Court saw things differently. It was
the court's view that the impact of the tax is ultimately borne
by the consumer, and not the wholesalers or retailers.
In so
concluding, the court relied upon the wording of the ordinance
itself which explicitly declared an intention that incidence of
the tax be placed upon the consumer, with the wholesalers and
261
262

52 Ill. 2d at 59-60, 284 N.E.2d at 260.
Id. at 60, 284 N.E.2d at 260.

263 Id.
264 Id.
265

Id. at 61, 284 N.E.2d at 261.
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retailers being merely collection agents for the tax.2 66 In essence,
the court declared that the tax was a sales or excise tax rather
than a tax upon occupations, 267 and therefore was within the
general authority to tax contained in section 6 (a) which requires
no enabling legislation.
The court's reliance upon the language of the tax and ordinance in order to ascertain the nature of the tax and its legal
ramifications has been criticized. Two commentators contend
that such a method of analysis reduces the question of constitutionality to one of legislative form and not substance ;261 one
of them specifically noted that the prior cigarette ordinance on
269
its face was termed an occupation tax.
However, the cases cited by the court make it clear that the
determination of the incidence of a tax has long been based on
the wording of the legislation in question.2 10 Consequently, the
treatment afforded the ordinance in Bloom is consistent with the
former analyses of legislation by the Illinois Supreme Court as
well as the Supreme Court of the United States.
The Bloom case is therefore important not only for its expansive language regarding the home rule taxing power, but also
266 Id. at 62, 284 N.E.2d at 262, quoting CHICAGO, ILL. MUN. CODE,
§ 178.1-2(c) (1972).
217 See VITULLO, supra note 12, at 88.
268 Id.
See also Recent Decisions, 61 ILL. B.J. 328, 329 (Feb. 1973) where
it was observed in a student article analyzing the Bloom case:
The Illinois Supreme Court's reliance on the language of the ordinance
results in a formalistic test being applied to determine the constitutionality of a tax imposed by a home rule unit. This criteria allows
cities to alter the characteristic of a tax by redrafting it in language
similar to that which was relevant in determining the incidence of the
Chicago cigarette tax.
269

Id. at 329.

The provisions in question of the former Chicago cigarette tax ordinance, CHICAGO, ILL. MUN. CODE, § 178.1 (1971) stated:
An occupation tax is imposed upon all retail tobacco dealers at the rate
of one cent per package of twenty cigarettes sold, offered, displayed or
kept for sale in the course of his business.
270 Two cases cited by the Illinois Supreme Court were of particular
relevance to the questions presented in the Bloom case. In First National
Bank of Maywood v. Jones, 48 Ill. 2d 282, 269 N.E.2d 494 (1971) the
contention was asserted that while the statute does not direct the seller to
pass the tax on to the purchaser, in fact this is done. The court rejected
the resulting conclusion that the incidence of the tax was upon the purchaser, stating:
The practice does not change the character of the tax.... The retailers'
occupation tax is levied upon the seller and the custom of passing the
burden to the buyer by means of a price increase does not alter its
nature. It is the legal incidence of the tax that controls.
Id. at 288, 269 N.E.2d at 496.
In Heyman v. Mahin, 49 Ill. 2d 284, 275 N.E.2d 421 (1971), the Cigarette Tax Act, which previously had been an occupation tax on distributors,
was amended in 1963 to become an occupation tax upon cigarette retailers,
with the enforcement machinery left unamended. The court held that the
amendment of the statute had changed the incidence of the tax:
We think the language of the Act is clear. The tax is no longer an
occupation tax imposed upon distributors of cigarettes but is an occupation tax imposed upon those engaged in business as retailers of
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for its reaffirmance of the principle that the wording of legislative provisions may determine the legal incidence of a tax. Thus,
if home rule units draft legislation which clearly states that the
tax shall ultimately be borne by the consumer, then, if future
opinions remain consistent with Bloom, the tax will be considered
a proper exercise of the self-executing home rule authority to
pass excise or sales taxes, rather than an occupation tax requiring prior legislative approval.
2Jacobs v. City of Chicago '

In a case presenting issues much like those in Bloom v.
Korshak, the plaintiffs in Jacobs challenged the constitutionality
of the Chicago Parking Tax Ordinance's 7 which became effective
January 1, 1972. Their main contention was that the tax
was actually an attempt to license for revenue, which requires
enabling legislation under the provisions of section 6 (e) of
article VII.2713 The basis for this argument was similar to one of
the points raised in Bloom, i.e., that the ordinance required the
operator of parking facilities to collect the tax and remit the
funds to the tax collector, with the failure to do so justifying
24
revocation of any city licenses held by the operator.
However, consistent with Bloom, the court, in a unanimous
opinion by Mr. Justice Ryan, looked to the wording of the
ordinance to ascertain its character. In holding that the ordinance was not a license for revenue levied upon the operator
of the parking facility, the court noted that section 2 (b)
of the ordinance provided that the ultimate incidence of and
liability for the tax is to be borne by the person seeking the
privilege of occupying space within the parking facility.215 The
fact that the operator is required to collect the tax and remit
the money merely makes the operator a collection agent for the
city and not the object of the tax itself, despite his possible
2 76
liability for failure to collect the tax.
Thus, the standard of legislative construction applied in
Bloom v. Korshak, which determines the incidence of a tax
cigarettes in this state. Since the statute specifically requires that the
distributor pass the tax on to the retailer, no incidence of the tax falls
upon the distributor.
Id. at 288, 275 N.E.2d at 424.
271 53 Ill. 2d 421, 227 N.E.2d 401 (1973).
272 CHICAGO, ILL. MUN. CODE, §§ 156.1 et seq. (1972).
273 53 Ill. 2d at 424, 227 N.E.2d at 403.
274

Id.

275 Id.
276 Id.
The court cited Bloom v. Korshak, 52 Ill. 2d 56, 63, 284 N.E.2d
261, to emphasize that the provision for penalties upon the collector of the tax
does not cause said tax to become a license for revenue: " [Such penalties]
are but provisions to insure the integrity of the collection procedure."
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claimed to be a tax upon occupations, was utilized in Jacobs
where the tax was assailed as being a license for revenue. Consequently, the same remarks made in the Bloom commentary
regarding the need for carefully drawn ordinances to support the
self-executing exercise of home rule taking authority are equally
applicable to Jacobs type situations.
Rozner v. Korshak27

In Rozner, the City of Chicago Wheel Tax License Ordinanc e "' was assailed as in Jacobs upon the claim that it was
a license for revenue and therefore invalid.279

Writing for a

unanimous court, Mr. Justice Schaefer rejected this contention,
observing that plaintiffs' position was based upon a misunder' 2 -0
standing of the meaning of the phrase "to license for revenue.
The imposition of a license fee can be based upon either of two
distinct powers: the power to regulate or the power to tax. The
phrase "to license for revenue" has historically come into play
when a governmental unit which did not possess the power to
tax attempted to raise revenues through the exercise of its regu2latory or police power.. ' 1
Though recognizing that the prohibition against the utilization of the police power has been maintained in article VII,
section 6 (e), the court determined that the wheel ordinance was
passed pursuant to Chicago's home rule taxing power, rather
than regulatory power, despite the fact that the ordinance is
''8
entitled "Wheel Tax Licenses. 2 2

Alternatively, the Rozner plaintiffs maintained that even if
the ordinance were a proper exercise of the city's home rule
power, its authority to act was rescinded by legislative amendments to the Motor Vehicle Code, approved by the vote of three:
fifths of the members elected to each house.21 1

In analyzing this contention, Mr. Justice Schaefer makes a
forthright comment on a matter of extreme importance to the
consideration of home rule authority, i.e., the effect of pre-existing statutes upon the exercise of home rule powers:
The limitations contained in these sections [the amendments to
the State Motor Vehicle Code] were, of course, superseded with
Ill. S. Ct. No. 45689, 55 Ill. 2d 430, 303 N.E.2d 389 (1973).
CHICAGO, ILL. MUN. CODE, § 29-1 et seq. (1972).
This ordinance makes it unlawful for any motor vehicle owner residing
in the City of Chicago to operate the vehicle upon the public ways of the
city unless it is licensed according to the terms of the ordinance.
279 55 I1.
2d 430, 431, 303 N.E.2d 389, 390.
2so Id.
at 432-33, 303 N.E.2d at 390.
281 Id. at 433, 303 N.E.2d at 390.
282 Id.
at 433, 303 N.E.2d at 390-91.
*-8,.Id. at 433, 303 N.E.2d at 391.
27S
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respect to home-rule units by the adoption of the Constitution of
1970.2814
Although similar statements were made at greater length in two
earlier opinions, Kanellos v. County of Cook28 5 and People ex rel.
Hanrahan v. Beck, "'6 it is important to note that the solution
to the crucial question of the effect of pre-existing legislation has
apparently evolved into a self-evident pronouncement needing no
authority to support it.
The Rozner plaintiffs further contended, however, that even
if the force of such legislation were removed with the enactment
of the new constitution, pre-existing legislative limitations were
reinstated by a later amendment to the Motor Vehicle Code,' 8
which was approved by three-fifths of both houses of the General
Assembly.*-' s The court also declined to accept the theory that any
amendment by a three-fifths approval would per se effect limitations upon home rule authority. Instead, using language unmistakably intended to require an express and unequivocal
statement that home rule powers are to be restricted, Mr.
Justice Schaefer noted:
The powers which those units have received under section 6 of
article VII of the constitution of 1970 are in addition to the
powers heretofore or hereafter granted by the General Assembly
to other municipalities. The kind of inadvertent restriction of the
authority of home-rule units for which the plaintiff contends can
be avoided if statutes that are intended to limit or deny home-rule
9
powers contain an express statement to that effect. 2 "1
Viewing the amendment in question, the court observed
that the words "or motor bicycles" were deleted and the phrase
"of a motor vehicle" was added.29° When this change was analyzed in the context of other provisions in the Motor Vehicle
Code, the court ruled that the amendment was made merely to
clarify a possible misreading of the immediately preceding two
paragraphs..2 9 1 Since there was no indication in the amendment
at 434, 303 N.E.2d at 391.
53 Ill. 2d 161, 290 N.E.2d 240 (1972). See also notes 295-312 inf!ra
and accompanying text.
286 54 Ill. 2d 561, 301 N.E.2d 281 (1973).
See also notes 392-408 infra
and accompanying text.
287 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 951/,
11-211 (1972).
288 See 55 Ill. 2d at 434, 303 N.E.2d at 391.
289 Id.
at 435, 303 N.E.2d 392.
290 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 951/,
11-211 (1972).
291 The Illinois Statute concerned the regulation of motor vehicles in
parking areas connected with hospitals, shopping centers and the like and
defined the "owner" as the actual legal owner of the property or the person
who manages or controls said property. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 9512,
11-211
(1972).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 951 , 11-210 (1971) is concerned with the authority
of the owner of real property who permits the public to use said property
for the purposes of vehicular travel.
Paragraph 11-211 originally read in relevant part "No owner shall be
limited as to speed upon any public place .......
In light of the two
preceding paragraphs, an obvious problem of interpretation arose as to the
284

285

Id.
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of an intent to restrict home rule authority, the amendment was
determined to have no restrictive effect.2 -'
It is the opinion of this author that the Rozner decision was
correctly decided and is totally consistent with section 6 (i) which
requires that, in the absence of a specific statement of exclusivity
by the General Assembly, home-rule units are empowered to
exercise functions concurrently with the state2 ' 3 This judicial
approach is an encouraging one and appears to indicate that
the supreme court will closely scrutinize new legislation in order
to insure that the General Assembly actually intends to limit
home rule authority. If this approach is maintained in future
cases, thL problem of judicial preemption which has hampered
2 94
home rule in virtually every state will be greatly minimized.

Kanellos v. County of Cook

20.5

The Kanellos case, which initially involved a very limited
issue of constitutional interpretation, resulted in an opinion of
great significance. 9 6 The decision contains expansive language
supporting the proposition that the exercise of home rule authority can result in the superseding of pre-existing statutory
limitations.
Plaintiff Kanellos brought a class action suit on behalf of
himself and all other citizens and taxpayers of Cook County,
challenging the constitutionality of a Cook County Board resolution which provided for the issuance of $10,000,000 of general
obligation bonds without obtaining referendum approval by the
voters of Cook County. Kanellos based his challenge upon
article VII, section 6 (j) which provides that "The General
Assembly may limit by law the amount of debt which home rule
counties may incur . . ." and also upon the fact that the General
Assembly had long required referendum approval for the issu2 97
ance of such bonds.
In a unanimous opinion, Mr. Justice Kluczynski rejected
plaintiff's contention, noting that according to the plain language
term "owner."
This was subsequently cured with the 1972 amendment.
The language presently reads: "No owner of a motor vehicle shall be
limited as to speed upon any public place. ..."
292 55 Ill. 2d at 435, 303 N.E.2d at 392.
29: See note 153 sup'a.
294 See notes 154-64 supra.
29553 Ill. 2d 161, 290 N.E.2d 242 (1972).
'"
COHN, Judicial Decisions, supra note 67, at 10.
2117 53 Ill. 2d at 163-64, 290 N.E.2d at 242.
The statute which had imposed referendum requirements upon county
indebtedness was first passed in 1874 and is presently still applicable to
non-home rule counties. That provision, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 34, § 306
(1971), provides in pertinent part:
'When the county board of any county shall deem it necessary to issue
county bonds to enable them to perform any of the duties imposed upon
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of section 6 (j) the power to incur debt granted to Cook County
by section 6 (a) is not subject to any referendum requirement:
The language of Section 6(j) as applied to home-rule counties is
unambiguous (People ex rel. Keenan v. McGuane, 13 11. 2d 520,
527) and the records of the convention provide no persuasive basis
for not giving it effect. Section 6(j) authorizes the General Assembly to limit by law only the amount of debt which a home-rule
county may incur and does not pertain to a referendum. It is
therefore inapplicable.218

The court further observed that section 6 (k), involving the
power to incur home-rule municipal debt from ad valorem
property taxes, specifically mentions the authority of the General
Assembly to impose a referendum requirement. This was seen
as further proof of the intention of the convention; for had the
framers wished to impose a referendum requirement upon county
indebtedness, "it would have been a simple procedure to specifiaccomplished
cally include such a provision in section 6 (j) as was
' 9
for home-rule municipalities in section 6 (k) . 1
"

Consequently, the court held that the statute enacted prior
to the 1970 Constitution, which imposed a referendum requirement upon county indebtedness,'10 was invalid in view of section
9 of the Transition Schedule of the new constitution, which
basically permitted only laws not contrary to, or inconsistent
with the new constitution to remain in force. 30 ' The language
the court utilized to explain this ruling is set out in full below
because of the importance of this holding in the context of the
fundamental changes created by the home rule section:
The concept of home rule adopted under the provisions of the
1970 constitution was designed to drastically alter the relationship
which previously existed between local and State government. Formerly, the actions of local governmental units were limited to those
powers which were expressly authorized, implied or essential in
carrying out the legislature's grant of authority. Under the homerule provisions of the 1970 constitution, however, the power of the
General Assembly to limit the actions of home-rule units has been
circumscribed and home-rule units have been constitutionally
delegated greater autonomy in the determination of their government and affairs. To accomplish this independence the constitution
conferred substantial powers upon home-rule units subject only
to those restrictions imposed or authorized therein.
We therefore hold that this statute is inapplicable as applied
to a home-rule county. It was enacted prior to and not in anticithem by law, they may, by an order entered of record, specifying the
amount of bonds required, and the object for which they are to be
issued, submit to the legal voters of their county, at any general or
special election, the question of issuing such county bonds ....
29s 53 Il1. 2d at 164-65, 290 N.E.2d at 242-43.
291 Id. at 165, 290 N.E.2d at 243.
300 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 34, § 306 (1971), quoted at note 297 supra.

-301 See note 166 supra for the exact language of the pertinent parts of

the Transition Schedule.
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pation of the constitution of 1970 which introduced the concepts
of home rule and the related limitation of sections 6(g) and 6 (h).
Such considerations were totally foreign in the contemplation of
legislation adopted prior to the 1970 constitution. The statute

is therefore inconsistent3 0 with
the provisions of section 6(g) and
2
the Transition Schedule.

In the words of Chairman Parkhurst, this language "put an end
to the lingering doubts about the continuing effect of limiting
''0
statutes enacted before home rule. 13 3
However, after issuing this broad ruling that the preexisting statutory requirement of referendum approval for
county indebtedness does not apply to Cook County, the court
took an apparently contradictory position with respect to the
power of the General Assembly to enact future legislation in
this regard. This posture was taken despite the lack of any
constitutional language permitting the enactment of legislation

which imposes future referendum requirements.

The court

nevertheless ruled that the General Assembly possessed such
authority. In support of this holding, the court relied upon the
language in the official explanation sent to each voter prior to
the ratification of the 1970 Constitution. The explanation stated

that "Home Rule counties may incur debt subject to limitation or

3
referendum requirements imposed by the General Assembly." 04

Furthermore, the court noted that this official explanation was
also consistent with the initial intent of the Local Government
Committee as expressed in its report. ° 5 Consequently, the court
ruled that the provisions of section 6 (g) of article VII applied,
thereby permitting the General Assembly to impose a referendum
requirement by a three-fifths vote of the members elected to both
houses.306
53 Ill. 2d at 166-67, 290 N.E.2d at 243-44 (authorities omitted).
Parkhurst, Two Years Later: The Status of Home Rule in Illinois,
at 5 (1973).
(One of the background papers prepared for the Illinois Assembly on Home Rule) [hereinafter cited as PARKHURST, Status of Home
Rule].
34 53 Ill. 2d at 165, 290 N.E.2d 243,
quoting P.A. 76-40, § 13, Laws
of 1969, vol. I, at 65.
302
303

305 Id.

Paragraph 4.7 of the Local Government Article as proposed by the
Local Government Committee concerned the incurring of debt by local governments other than home rule municipalities, and provided:
The General Assembly may by general law limit the amount of debt
which other units of local government and school districts may incur.
Limits may vary according to functions performed and services provided. The General Assembly may require referendum approval of
such debt.
Committee Proposals,vol. VII at 1581.
306 53 Ill. 2d at 165, 290 N.E.2d at 243.
It was felt by the court that the "three-fifths" provision of section 6(g)
applied to the limitation in debt authority rather than the "majority" standard of section 6(h) because "The power of a home rule county to incur
debt is singularly of local concern and has not been exercised or performed
by the state." Id.
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The court took a seemingly contradictory position, inasmuch

as it considered that the lack of any constitutional language regarding a referendum requirement precluded the applicability

of pre-existing statutory limitations, but concurrently ruled that
the General Assembly possessed the implied authority to impose
such a requirement with the passage of new legislation by a

three-fifths vote. It is the opinion of this author, who represented Cook County in this litigation, that the apparent contradiction was the result of a compromise reached on the basis of

information not appearing in the written decision.

Proposed

paragraph 4.7 3 07 was approved on first reading in exactly the
08
same form as proposed by the Local Government Committee
However, the Committee on Style, Drafting and Submission
(whose function was to make only stylistic changes of the

textual material as approved after each reading by the convention as a whole) deleted the language authorizing the General
Assembly to require referendum approval of debt incurred by

governmental units, including home rule counties. 3 9 A problem
of interpretation arose not only because the creation of such an
essential change was beyond the authority of this committee,
but also because the committee failed to provide an adequate
explanation for the alteration. 310 Additionally, since nothing was
included in subsequent debates to shed any light on the basis

for this action, the court was literally searching for a black hat
in a dark room when it attempted to ascertain the constitutional intent in this regard. Accordingly, it appears that the
ultimate decision in Kanellos was the product of compromise
307

See note 305 supra.

308 See Committee Proposals, vol. VII at 1977-78.
309 Section 8(h) as proposed by the Committee on Style, Drafting and

Submission after first reading included language in the exact form as now
found in article VII, section 6(j), except that the term "home rule municipalities" as now appears in 6 (j) read as "other home rule units" in proposed
section 8(h). Id. at 1973.
310 The report of that committee merely stated in explanation:
The debt provisions are somewhat complicated:
(a) Home Rule
counties may incur debt but the General Assembly may impose a limit
on that debt by law.
Id. at 1991.
It should also be noted that this author personally attempted during the
lower court litigation to informally ascertain the rationale for this essential
change by speaking with Wayne W. Whalen, Chairman of the Committee on
Style, Drafting and Submission, Vice-Chairman Philip J. Carey of the Local
Government Committee, and Delegate David E. Stahl, also of the Local
Government Committee. None of them could provide me with the basis for
this modification.
It is my feeling that the resulting confusion was primarily due to the
fact that the Local Government Article was the last article considered by
the convention, and the extreme press of time precluded adequate discussion
and analysis in some instances. Several convention delegates have privately noted to me that they felt that the convention should have been
allowed to continue another month in order to afford the time for sufficient
final deliberation.

312
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whereby a middle position was taken between the demand for
the continuing application of the pre-existing statutory requirement of referendum approval of all county debt (an interpretation supported by the official explanation) and the claim that the
lack of any specific constitutional language precluded any legislative authority to impose a referendum requirement.
However, as was noted earlier,:"' the General Assembly has
not yet imposed any such referendum requirements and Cook
County has been able to pass $22,000,000 in referendum-free
bonds. The Kanellos compromise, therefore, has not yet affected
the ability of home rule counties to incur debt without referendum, and it is predicted that in the absence of any radical
change in the composition of the membership of the General
312 Assembly, this authority will continue in an unaltered fashion.
Bridgman v. Korzenla
The Cook County Board of Commissioners enacted an ordinance on February 7, 1972,314 which expressly purported to
supersede the provisions of the Illinois Revenue Act dealing with
the collection of real estate taxes. 15 The essence of the ordinance
was to alter the statutory method of tax collection, which provides for two payment dates (May 1 and September 1), by
substituting a four-installment system. Under the county plan,
the first three installments would be on estimated amounts computed on the basis of one-sixth each of the preceding year's bill,
with these payments due respectively on January 15, March 15,
and May 15.316 The final installment was to be due on July 15,
thirty days after the actual bill was to be mailed, reflecting
the total amount of the yearly tax and the amount remaining
317
to be paid.
The reason underlying the modification of the collection
procedure so as to require earlier payments of real estate taxes,
was to avoid the necessity of selling large amounts of taxanticipation warrants, which, in the past, had been costly in
3 18
terms of the interest payments.
311

See notes 96 and 196 supra.

As observed in note 196, two bills introduced in the Senate to impose
referendum requirements upon home rule county debt power were recently
tabled after first reading.
313 54 11.
2d 74, 295 N.E.2d 9 (1972).
314 Cook County Ordinance 72-1 effective March 1, 1972.
.15 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, T 569, 593, 644, 645, 675 & 705 (1971).
316 54 I1.
2d at 75, 295 N.E.2d at 9-10.
317 Id.
318 The appendix to the brief of Cook County in the Illinois Supreme
Court contained a report stating that, based on the responses of 561 of the
total of 642 taxing bodies in Cook County which replied to a county questionnaire, taking into consideration only those taxing bodies paying more than
$100,000 per year in interest, the total amount of interest paid. on tax312
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In addressing itself to a taxpayer class action challenge
to the county ordinance, the Illinois Supreme Court unanimously 31 9 issued a "disturbing" decision. 32 0 In the opinion of
this author, the decision could portend severe problems for the
effective exercise of home rule authority in the future.
As the court properly analyzed, the issue of the case was
"whether the power which it [Cook County] exercises and the
function which it performs in the process of collecting property
taxes pertain 'to its government and affairs' " within the definition of section 6 (a) .321 Though initially seeming to conclude that
such an activity could be termed a local function (i.e., " ...a
review of the pertinent legislation shows a definitive trend toward
making the collection of taxes exclusively a county function ... ,"), 322 the court avoided such a determination by noting
that there still exist statutory provisions regarding the election
of township collectors. 323 Following this statement, Mr. Justice
Goldenhersh included an admittedly irrelevant discussion of the
history of the township collector system:
In 30 townships in Cook County lying outside the city of Chicago
there are 29 de jure town collectors, but by reason of our prior
opinions in Flynn v. Kueharski, 45 I1. 2d 211, Flynn v. Kucharski,
49 Ill. 2d 7 and Flynn v. Kucharski, 53 I1. 2d 88, these officials
are not collecting property taxes and the 4collection process, pres32
ently is being performed by the county.
Despite the obvious concession that the only governmental
entity collecting real estate taxes is Cook County, the court
nevertheless rejected the contention that the activity is a local
function so as to qualify it as a proper exercise of home rule
authority under section 6(a):
Although obviously there are powers and functions of county
government which pertain to its government and affairs within
the contemplation of section 6 of article VII (Kanellos v. County
of Cook, 53 Ill. 2d 161), the collection of property taxes is not one
of them. In the process of collecting and distributing tax monies
the county acts both for itself and the other taxing bodies authorized to levy taxes on property within the county, and the function
anticipation warrants in 1971 by such taxing districts exceeded $32,000,000.
The reason for such a high interest figure is that many taxing bodies
have fiscal years which begin months prior to the actual collection of taxes.
The fiscal year of Cook County commences, for example, on December 1,
and the payment of taxes is not due under the statutes (ILL. RENT. STAT.
ch. 120,
705 (1971)) until May 1. In recent years that initial payment
date has been delayed because of the late issuance of tax bills. The first
installment of the 1972 taxes, for example, was not due and owing until
July 1, 1973.
3 Mr. Justice Ward initially dissented, with no written comments, as
evidenced by the slip sheet opinion, but later withdrew his dissent when the
opinion was published.
320 COHN, Judicial Decisions, supra note 67, at 9.
32: 54 Ill. 2d at 75-76, 295 N.E.2d at 10.
322id.
at 76, 295 N.E.2d at 10.
323 Id.
324

Id. at 78, 295 N.E.2d at 10-11.
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thus performed does not pertain to its government and affairs to
any greater extent than to the government and affairs of the other
taxing bodies for whose benefit it acts. We find no provision in
the constitution of 1970 or in the proceedings of the convention
which leads us to believe that the collection of property taxes is a
home-rule power or function within the contemplation of section

25
6 of article VII.A
This author fully concurs with the analysis of Professor
Cohn when he observed that the Bridgman rationale is "not
very persuasive."3' 6 The only government in Cook County possessing the authority to collect taxes is Cook County, through
its county treasurer as ex-officio county collector 2 1 Consequently, by definition, its tax collecting authority is a function
which is local to Cook County and one that is solely its affair.
The fact that it performs this service for all the other taxing
bodies located within Cook County should be irrelevant, so long
as it is solely the county's function.
The court's notion that merely because an activity has an
impact on other governmental entities renders it other than local
in character, promises a partial return to the "Dillon" philosophy.
As Mr. Parkhurst has noted, in Bridgman "the court followed the
familiar and traditional judicial habit of trying to define and

circumscribe 'local affairs.'

"828

As I have observed throughout this article, the most serious
reservation I have regarding the home rule section is that it
permits the possibility of undue judicial limitation of the
concept of home rule. The "preemption provisions" of sections
6(g), (h) and (i), as well as the mandate of section 6(m) to
liberally construe powers and functions of home rule units, go a
long way in providing insurance against judicial limitation. But
the preemption question never arises if the threshold issue is
not resolved in the affirmative (i.e., does the power or function
pertain to the home rule unit's "government and affairs"). The
Illinois Supreme Court took an unduly restrictive approach in its
analysis in Bridgman, but it is hoped that a more expansive view
will prevail in future decisions considering the exercise of
authority for the benefit of other governments as well as for the
benefit of the home rule units themselves.3 29 In view of the
court's generally positive approach toward home rule, it is felt
that a more liberal attitude in defining the contours of the phrase
"pertaining to its government and affairs" might well be forthcoming.
3

25 Id.

Judicial Decisions, supra note 67, at 10.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120,
688 (1971).
328 PARKIHURST, Status of Home Rule, supra note 303, at 8.
329 Professor
Cohn has also taken this same hopeful position.
COHN, Judicial Decisions, supra note 67, at 10.
326

COHN,

327

See
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City of Evanston v. County of Cook

:10

The City of Evanston decision was the first of four cases
which included dissenting opinions that evidenced serious splits
of opinion relating to some aspects of the home rule question.
Cook County, pursuant to its home rule authority to tax,
adopted an ordinance effective January 1, 1972,31 which imposed
a tax upon the purchasers of new motor vehicles in Cook County.
The amount of the tax was determined according to a classifi2
cation of different types of vehicles.33
Six home rule municipalities located within Cook County,
including Evanston, subsequently passed ordinances imposing a
similar tax in the same amounts. On its face, each ordinance
declared that it was in conflict with the county ordinance and,
therefore, pursuant to the terms of section 6 (c), must be deemed
within its municipal borders to prevail over the county ordi333
nance.
In considering the question of whether section 6 (c) applied
to a situation where substantially identical taxes are passed by a
home rule county and a home rule municipality, the supreme
court ruled in the negative, in a four to three opinion written by
Mr. Justice Ryan. Initially addressing itself to the reverse of an
argument that had been made earlier, in the Bloom case, 33 4 the
court ruled that the power to tax conferred by section 6(a) is
not limited to nonproperty taxation 3 3 The court observed that
the only limitations imposed upon the power to tax are found
in section 6(e), which prohibits taxes upon income, earnings
and occupation without legislative approval, and in section 6 (g)
which permits the General Assembly to limit the power by a
three-fifths vote. In view of the requirement of liberal construction of home rule authority found in section 6(m) as well
as the examples found in the Local Government Report wherein
property taxes were viewed as within the home rule power, the
court ruled that the restrictive construction as urged by the plaintiffs could not be accepted. 33 6 In short, there is simply no distinction between property and nonproperty taxes when considering
the general home rule power to tax found in section 6 (a).
In considering the primary issue presented in City of
Evanston (i.e., whether the passage of the same type of tax by
Evanston and Cook County created a conflict within the definiIll. 2d 312, 291 N.E.2d 823 (1973).
See Cook County Ordinance entitled "An Ordinance to Provide for a
Tax on the Retail Sale of New Motor Vehicles," passed on January 1, 1972.
:3, 53 Ill. 2d at 314, 291 N.E.2d at 824.
33053
331

333 Id.
334 See 52 I1. 2d 56, 59, 284 N.E.2d 257, 260.
335

53 Ill. 2d at 316, 291 N.E.2d at 825.

336 Id.
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tion of section 6 (c)) the court initially agreed with the plaintiffs' contention that it was the intention of the constitutional
convention to establish a preference for municipal authority over
home rule county authority in certain situations.", However,
the court refused to uniformly apply this principle to every case
where a municipality decides to legislate on the same subject as a
home rule county. Citing the Local Government Committee Report, the court noted that section 6 (c) was enacted to resolve conflicts in ordinances and not to establish a system of preemption of
authority. 338 The court further observed that if the provisions
of section 6 (c) were viewed as establishing the principle of
preemption in favor of municipalities, instead of only a means
of resolving conflicts and inconsistencies, then a municipality
could defeat the effect of a home rule county tax within its
borders by imposing only a nominal tax on the same object or
transaction. 39 In view of the indispensable role which adequate
finances play in the operation of home rule government, the court
refused to accept the construction of section 6(c) as proposed
by the plaintiffs which would greatly weaken home rule counties
40
by limiting their power to tax.
In short, the case presented no conflict or inconsistency
within the meaning of section 6(c). Rather, the case simply
presented a situation wherein two home rule units were exercising the power which they each possessed pursuant to section
6(a) and were taxing the same transaction. 41 Finally, the
majority rejected plaintiffs' contention that a decision in favor
of Cook County would lead to a depletion of the sources of
municipal revenue since the county could then impose taxes on
a host of transactions and since, as a practical matter, the
municipalities would thereby be precluded from burdening their
residents with the same tax. Though recognizing the possibility
of abuse, the court reasonably noted that such a possibility did
not require denying the power to Cook County under these circumstances. Rather, the proper avenue to follow in rectifying
or eliminating these abuses is through legislation enacted by the
Id. at 317-18, 291 N.E.2d at 825-26.
Id. at 318, 291 N.E.2d at 826.
339 Id.
337
338

840

Id.

Id. at 318-19, 291 N.E.2d at 826.
The basic reason why the power to tax is to be considered in a different
341

light from other home rule powers in the context of section 6(c) is because

the purpose of taxation is revenue and not regulation and consequently no

conflict results with two revenue enactments.

See LoYoLA U. L.J. supra

note 71, at 493.
The court had earlier ruled in the City of Evanston opinion that two such
taxes, imposed upon the same transaction, was not double taxation within

the definition established by earlier opinions prohibiting such taxing schemes,
since the instant taxes were imposed by different taxing districts. 53 Ill. 2d

at 315, 291 N.E.2d at 825-26.
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General Assembly by a three-fifths vote of both houses pursuant
to section 6 (g).12
A strongly worded dissent by Mr. Justice Schaefer, with
Justices Davis and Underwood joining, 34 3 argued that the power
to tax should be treated no differently than any other home rule
power when considering the extent of a "conflict" within the
context of section 6 (c) .34 Furthermore, the dissent objected to
the majority's holding that section 6 (c) was to be limited
to contradictions and inconsistencies between home rule county
and municipal ordinances. Rather, the dissenters thought that
section 6(c) should also apply in cases where county 4 activity
within municipal areas is unacceptable to city officials.3
The dissenters were also of the opinion that the majority
ruling would create a meaningless burden on both municipalities
and Cook County by requiring the dual regulation of such
activities as new construction and alteration of existing buildings.3 46 However, the dissenters failed to take into consideration the fact that the question presented to the court and the
treatment afforded that question by the majority was limited
solely to the power to tax and did not concern the power to
license or any other home rule power. As the majority opinion
specifically noted in response to citations from the constitutional
debates where section 6 (c) was said to apply:
We do not find these statements in the debates helpful because
they concerned zoning and certain regulatory and licensing ordinances of home rule units. In such ordinances there are clear
opportunities for contradictions and conflicts between the ordiThe
nances of the municipalities and ordinances of the county.
3
discussion did not deal with ordinances involving taxation.
Finally, the dissenting justices seem to have erroneously
viewed the extent of the authority of home rule counties. The
dissenters compared the home rule power to tax with the statutory power granted to counties to levy a retailer's occupation tax
4
and then observed that
only in their unincorporated areas,"3
5

47

1

Id. at 319, 291 N.E.2d 826.
Professor Cohn has noted that a dissent such as this by three justices
is an extraordinary occurrence in Illinois Supreme Court experience. COHN,
Judicial Decisions, supra note 67, at 9.
344 53 Ill. 2d at 320, 291 N.E.2d at 827.
The dissent, however, failed to note the differing treatment afforded
the power to tax in the "preemption sections," with section 6(g) specifically
requiring a three-fifths vote of both houses to deny or limit a taxing power,
whereas the state can limit any other home rule power by a mere majority
vote by preempting and entering the field.
Furthermore, the dissent failed to cite, and indeed cannot cite, any
statement from the Local Government Committee Report or the debates,
where section 6(c) was declared to be applicable to the home rule taxing
power.
345 53 111. 2d at 323, 291 N.E.2d at 829.
346 Id.
147 Id.
at 317. 291 N.E.2d at 825.
34 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 34, § 409.1 (1971).
342

343

318
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"the recognition of authority of a home rule county to levy a tax
of this kind upon transactions which take place in the unincorporated areas of the county will fully meet the needs of the
county without adversely affecting the power of home rule
'3 9
municipalities to raise necessary funds. 4
Two interpretations are possible from a reading of this
language. First, like the statutory power granted to impose a
retailer occupation tax, Cook County has the authority to impose
taxes only in the unincorporated areas of the county. 350 If this
is what was intended, then the three dissenting justices have
misconstrued the very basic concept of the home rule authority
given to counties. As the report of the Local Government
Committee specifically noted:
County home rule powers granted by paragraph 3.1(a) [now article VII, section 6 (a)] embrace the entire county, including areas
within municipal boundaries. 511
The second possible interpretation is that the "conflict"
provisions of section 6(c) empower both home rule and nonhome rule municipalities to preclude home rule taxing authority
within their borders. This interpretation arises in view of the
dissenting language that the "authority in a home rule county to
levy a tax . . . in the unincorporated areas of the county will
fully meet the needs of the county . . . -352 This second construction is also without constitutional basis, for the authority
of non-home rule municipalities does not include the self-executing power to tax. Lacking the authority to pass taxing ordinances, non-home rule municipalities obviously cannot create
"conflicts" with the taxing ordinances enacted by home rule
counties so as to permit the operation of section 6 (c).
This author is disturbed with the dissenting opinion under
either interpretation, for both constructions indicate an erroneous application of the pertinent home rule provisions. In
my view, the majority ruling is the only reasonable position
possible in light of the unequivocal constitutional desire to
strengthen county government in order to permit effective
349 53 Ill. 2d at 324, 291 N.E.2d at 829-30.
35o This severely restrictive view of the power possessed by home rule

counties would be consistent with the question posed by Mr. Justice Schaefer

during the oral arguments in this case to Jack Siegel, attorney for Evanston.
Justice Schaefer asked him if it was not true that the authority of Cook
County extended only to the unincorporated areas. Siegel replied that his

study of the issue led him to conclude that Cook County had the authority

to govern throughout the geographic area of the county, subject, of course,
to the "conflict" provisions of section 6(c). Justice Schaefer seems to have
discarded even Siegel's opinion, if this first interpretation of his dissent is

correct.

351 Committee Proposals, vol. VII at 1646.
352

53 Ill. 2d at 324, 291 N.E.2d at 829-30.
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treatment of matters of area-wide concern.3 5' Had the position
of the dissenting justices prevailed, it would have been safe to
predict that Cook County's taxing power would have been
limited to the non-home rule municipalities and the unincorporated areas. Under the dissenters' theory, home rule municipalities would have been presented with an ideal method of
raising revenues without any local criticism by explaining to
their citizens that the passage of a municipal taxing ordinance
was simply an effort at the localization and supersession of an
otherwise valid county tax.
Fortunately, the dissent did not prevail and Cook County
still possesses the power to tax on an equal level with home rule
municipalities. The City of Evanston opinion is, therefore, of
critical importance because it judicially insures the continued
validity of home rule at both the county and municipal levels,
through the protection of adequate revenue sources for all homerule entities.
Oak Park Federal Savings and Loan Association v.
3 4
Village of Oak Park 5

The Oak Park case presented the first opportunity for the
Illinois Supreme Court to consider the meaning of article VII,
section 6 (1) (2), which provides:
The General Assembly may not deny or limit the power of
home rule units . . . (2) to levy or impose additional taxes upon
areas within their boundaries in the manner provided by law for
the provision of special services to those areas and for the payment
of debt incurred in order to provide those special services.
The Oak Park construction of this provision is, in the
opinion of this author, unduly restrictive and inconsistent with
the concept of home rule as envisioned by the members of the
convention.
At issue was the constitutionality of five ordinances enacted
by the Village of Oak Park pursuant to its home rule authority
to tax for the provision of special services pursuant to section
6 (1) (2). The problem faced by the court in deciding this issue
was to construe this constitutional provision in a manner so as
to give meaning to the prohibitory language: "The General
Assembly may not deny or limit the power of home rule units,"
as well as the seemingly qualifying phrase: "in the manner as
provided by law." 3
The Village of Oak Park contended that
3.. The majority ruling is also supported on this same basis by the
author of a case comment considering the instant opinion. LoYoLA U. L.J.,
supra note 71, at 495-96.
354 54 Ill. 2d 200, 296 N.E.2d 344 (1973).
a55 Id. at 203, 296 N.E.2d at 346-47 (emphasis in original).
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the latter phrase meant that the provisions previously established
by the Revenue Act of 19393'.76 were intended to apply, thereby
permitting the application of section 6(l) (2) without further
enabling legislation .1
7
The court, however, rejected this proffered interpretation in a four to three opinion authored by Mr.
Justice Ryan. The majority observed that since the concept
"differential" taxation embodied in the "special services" provision was newly introduced to Illinois law with the 1970
Constitution, the necessary statutory framework could not be
found in the Revenue Act of 1939 which pre-dated the new
constitution. 38 Consequently, although the first part of section
6(1) prohibits the General Assembly from interfering with the
home rule powers enunciated in that subsection, this limitation
upon the legislature takes effect only after enabling legislation is
enacted subsequent to the effective date of the new constitution.
In the opinion of the majority, any other construction would
render the phrase "in the manner provided by law," meaningless.35 9 Therefore, in the absence of enabling legislation, the
attempt by the Village of Oak Park to exercise the home rule
powers of section 6(1) (2) through the passage of five ordi60
nances, was ruled to be void.3
A forceful dissent was filed by Mr. Justice Ward who was
joined by Chief Justice Underwood and Mr. Justice Goldenhersh.
The dissenting opinion began by vigorously stating that "the
opinion of the majority . .. seriously contradicts an authority
The
conferred on home rule units by the constitution."' 361
dissent criticized the majority opinion for considering section
6(1) in isolation, while making no reference to sections 6(a),
6 (g) or 6 (h) .362 Section 6(a) was emphasized as the grant of
"comprehensive" authority to provide for the government and
affairs of a home rule unit, insuring in the words of the Local
Government Committee, "the broadest possible range of powers."' 36 :' Again quoting the Local Government Report, the dissenting opinion stressed the danger of strictly construing local
powers and emphasized that section 6 (1) was not intended as a
limitation upon home rule powers (unlike subsections (c) through
(k)). Rather, section 6 (1) was an explicit limitation upon the
authority of the General Assembly to restrict the powers of home
ch. 120, § 482, -etseq. (1971).
54 11. 2d at 204, 296 N.E.2d at 346-47.
38s Id. at 204-05, 296 N.E.2d at 347.
5359Id. at 203-04, 296 N.E.2d at 346-47.
360 Id. at 205, 296 N.E.2d at 347-48.
•361
Id., 296 N.E.2d at 348.
362 Id.
-163Id. at 206, 296 N.E.2d at 348.
356 ILL. REv. STAT.
.57
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rule units.364 The conclusion that the constitutional drafters
intended to insulate the home rule powers in section 6 (1) from
legislative restriction was also seen by the dissenters to be
evidenced by the fact that sections 6(g) and 6(h) both specififunctions of section 6(1) from the
cally exempt the powers or
3 65
effect of each subsection.
Furthermore, the dissent observed that a paradoxical consequence of the majority's holding was possible if the General
Assembly refused to enact the necessary enabling legislation.
In this manner, the legislature would have "done what the
constitution specifically prohibits, viz., denying the power"
through its inaction. 36
The dissenting opinion criticized the majority for failing
to refer to the constitutional proceedings in order to support
their opinion. Specific reference, however, was made in the
dissent to several pages of the verbatim transcripts of the
convention as well as to the reports of the Committee on Style,
Drafting and Submission in order to describe the constitutional
history of section 6(l). In short, a provision as originally proposed by the Local Government Committee included an outright
grant of authority to impose additional taxes for special services
as provided by general law 367 to all units of local general government. Due to some confusion, this provision was inadvertently
deleted after first reading by the Committee on Style, Drafting
and Submission. 368 However, a provision was reinstated in revised form by the Style, Drafting and Submission Committee
after second reading. 6 91 The new "special service" provision
would have clearly required enabling legislation as a condition
precedent to the passage of such local tax legislation. That
element of the provision was objected to on third reading, with
the result that the present section 6(1) was drafted and approved.370 A colloquy which occurred between Delegates Durr
and Carey, when the final version of section 6(l) was discussed,
was cited by the dissenting justices in support of their position
364
365

Id.

at 206-07, 296 N.E.2d at 348-49.

See text accompanying note 132 supra for a full recitation of article

VII, sections 6(g) and 6(h).

54 Ill. 2d at 208, 296 N.E.2d at 349.
Paragraph 4.2 of the Local Government Article as proposed by the
Local Government Committee. See Committee Proposals, vol. VII at 1662.
368 Committee Proposals, vol. VII at 1976.
369 Article VII, section 6(e) (3), as found in Style, Drafting and Submission Committee Proposal No. 15, provided:
366
367

A home rule unit shall have only the power that the General

Assembly may provide by law . . . (3) to levy or impose additional
taxes upon areas within its boundaries for the provision of special
services to those areas and for the payment of debt incurred in order to
provide those special services.
Committee Proposals, vol. VII at 2474-75.
370 Verbatim Transcripts, vol. V at 4248-49, 4450.
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that the power to levy special service taxes was not intended to
be dependent upon enabling legislation and indeed, was referred
7
to as a constitutional right.31
For these several reasons, the three dissenting jurists opined
that the legislation enacted prior to the new constitution with
regard to the collection of other types of taxes could constitute
the type of legislation envisioned in section 6(l) by the phrase
"in the manner provided by law."1 ' 72 Thus, in the opinion of
the dissenters, the Oak Park ordinances should have been held
valid.
This author fully concurs with the opinion rendered by the
dissenting justices, not only on the basis of my analysis of the
home rule issues, but also because of statutory construction
problems created with the majority ruling. 38 The basic question
contained in the Oak Park litigation again has been presented
to the court in Gilligan v. Korzen,31 where a challenge was made
to special service legislation enacted by Cook County through the
levy of a wheel tax upon vehicles owned by residents of the
unincorporated areas of the county. It is hoped that upon

reconsideration, the court will reverse its position and declare
that enabling legislation is not needed to permit Cook County
to exercise its authority to levy special service taxes pursuant to

section 6 (1).
Although the issue has now become moot regarding future
local special service legislation because of the enactment into law
of two bills which constitute the necessary enabling legislation as
required by the majority of the court in Oak Park,7" an analysis
54 Ill. 2d at 209, 296 N.E.2d at 348.
The following colloquy occurred in this context:
371

MR. DURR: Do I understand the effect of this would be to remove
from the power of the state any control over home rule units power to make special assessments for local improvements? Or their
power to exercise that power of special assessments with other counties
and municipalities and other units of local government? Or to levy
the special service taxes or levies within their boundaries? That would
remove it forever and ever from the General Assembly's domain?
MR. CAREY:
It makes it a constitutional right which the non-home
rule units now have and which the cities now have under the 1870
Constitution, with respect to special assessment.
372 54 Ill. 2d at 209, 296 N.E.2d at 350.
73 The latter consideration is treated at length in a student comment
discussing the Oak Park case. See Comment, Oak Park Federal Savings
and Loan Association v. Village of Oak Park: The Foundation Begins To
Crumble on Home Rule in Illinois, 6 JOHN MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. 395.
(1973). I don't entirely agree with its thesis (i.e., that the decision indicates that home rule is beginning to crumble in Illinois) because there are
several other decisions which have been rendered both before and after the
Oak Park opinion wherein the court has indicated a sympathetic and approving approach toward home rule. But I am disturbed by the seemingly
restrictive attitude evidenced by some members of the court when certain
issues involving home rule have been considered.
314 Ill. S. Ct. No. 45488.
.35See
note 186 supra. :
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of this decision has herein been made because of the assistance
it provides in the effort to ascertain the attitude of the Illinois
Supreme Court toward various aspects of the home rule question.
People ex rel. City of Salem v. McMackin-7An interesting opinion having important effects upon home
rule was rendered in the Salem case which concerned the constitutionality of an enactment specifically excluding application
to home rule units!
The Industrial Project Revenue Bond Act-77 was passed
in order to attract industrial developments to Illinois communities. The Act, which specifically applies only to non-home rule
municipalities," 8 empowered such municipalities to construct,
purchase or improve any industrial project either within the
municipality or without the municipality up to a distance of ten
miles from its borders and to issue bonds to finance this activity.379
In an original mandamus action brought to compel the
mayor of the City of Salem, a non-home rule municipality, to
sign both $1,000,000 in bonds and a lease which were authorized
under the terms of this Act, the court declared that the Act was
constitutional. In so ruling, the court rejected the respondent's
contention that the limitation of the Act to non-home rule municipalities violated the equal protection clause3s1 of the 1970
Constitution and therefore constituted special legislation.381
Furthermore, the court declared that the language indicating that the Act only applied to non-home rule municipalities
did not necessarily mean that the same powers are unavailable
to home rule municipalities. Citing the language of sections
6(a) and 6(m), the majority stated that "the constitutional
grant of power to home-rule municipalities appears to be of
sufficient breadth and scope to authorize such entities to adopt
this vehicle for economic development. '"
The court further
based this determination upon the fact that the acquisition of
land by purchase or gift is not an exercise of a governmental
power, but rather is an act of a proprietary nature (i.e., no
rights of sovereignty are to be exercised by municipalities pursuant to this Act). As such, home rule municipalities possess
the authority to so act by virtue of the general statutory and
376

53 Ill. 2d 347, 291 N.E.2d 807 (1972).

377 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, T 11-74-1 thru 11-74-13 (1971).
378 53 Ill. 2d at 353, 291 N.E.2d at 812.
379 Id. at 351, 291 N.E.2d at 810.
380 ILL. CONST. art. I, § 2 (1970).
381 ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 13 (1970).
382

53 Ill. 2d at 365, 291 N.E.2d at 818.
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But the

majority went even further and reiterated that although there
is some question of the home rule exercise of sovereign authority
beyond municipal borders, there is no constitutional provision
warranting the inference that a home rule municipality is unable
to act in a proprietary capacity beyond its corporate limits.
Indeed, according to the majority, the language of section 6(a)
that "a home rule unit may exercise any power and perform any
function pertaining to its government and affairs," affirmatively
dictates that home rule municipalities may act in a proprietary
3 84
capacity.
A strong dissent was submitted by Mr. Justice Schaefer in
which he reasoned that the entire Act was invalid for failure to
apply to any home rule municipalities. In Schaefer's opinion,
the quoted sentence precludes home rule municipalities from
exercising a power that the General Assembly has granted to all
other municipalities. Justice Schaefer reasoned that the activity
was forbidden because home rule authority does not permit the
purchase of land outside the borders of the home rule municipality, since this is not the exercise of a government power or
function.3 15

Justice Schaefer made specific reference to both the pertinent majority and minority proposals of the Local Government
Committee where, in each instance, the home rule authority was
intended to apply "within its corporate limits.3 83

6

When an

objection was raised during the debates that such language
might result in the conclusion that the General Assembly would
have no authority to grant home rule municipalities any extraterritorial power, the response was made by both Chairman
Parkhurst and Vice-Chairman Carey that such a conclusion was
clearly not intended.387 Justice Schaefer viewed this, as well as
other constitutional activity, as evidencing the fact that both
the proponents and opponents were in complete agreement that
the extraterritorial powers of home rule municipalities were to
be derived from the legislature and not from the constitution. 88 8
Justice Schaefer was also of the opinion that the purposes
of the Act (i.e., "to relieve conditions of unemployment, to aid in
the rehabilitation of returning veterans, and to encourage the
increase of industry within the state") were not subject to home
383

Id. at 365-66, 291 N.E.2d at 818.

.384Id. at 366, 291 N.E.2d at 818.
385 Id. at 369, 371, 291 N.E.2d at 820,821.

.86 Id. at 372, 291 N.E.2d at 822 (emphasis in original).
.87 Id. at 373, 291 N.E.2d at 822.
388 Id. at 374, 291 N.E.2d at 823.
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rule authority, since they are matters which pertain to "the government and affairs" of the state. Justice Schaefer opined that
these purposes could become matters which pertain to the government and affairs of a municipality only pursuant to a legislative delegation of authority'8
Although this last portion of the dissent has been criticized
as imposing a narrow and restrictive view toward what constitutes a local affair 9 0 (which in my opinion is the basic
problem which will plague Illinois home rule), the remainder
of the dissent has been described as consistent with the intent
39
of the convention. '
Whether or not the Salem decision is correct, the important point to observe for the purposes of this article is the extremely liberal approach toward home rule within the context
of the Salem issues. The determination that home rule municipalities possess an inherent authority to operate extraterritorily in a proprietary capacity, supports the view that the
supreme court is basically receptive to the concept of home rule.
9"
People ex rel. Hanrahan v. Beck3

The office of State's Attorney of Cook County found itself
in a totally different position when it brought the Beck suit challenging the action of one of its clients, the Cook County Board
of Commissioners.
At issue in Beck was the constitutionality of a Cook County
ordinance 33 which was "specifically intended to supersede" sections 1142 through 1142.14 of chapter 34 of the Illinois Revised
Statutes, 31 4 thereby effecting the removal of the statutory func•s9 d.

Professor Cohn has observed in this regard:
In this last statement Justice Schaefer contradicts the majority
conclusion that a home rule unit has the inherent power to engage in the
functions authorized for non-home rule municipalities by the Industrial
Project Act. The opinion of so prestigious a member of the Court may
augur ill for the exercise by home rule municipalities of powers or
functions pertaining to any matters in which the state may be said to
have a substantial interest or concern, and may foreshadow a narrow
approach to the resolution of conflicts between state and municipal
government reminiscent of the customary tendency of courts to favor
state supremacy by denying that the function is a matter of local
concern or one which pertains to municipal affairs.
COHN, Judicial Decisions, supra note 67, at 7.
3' Chairman Parkhurst has observed that even the staunchest advo390

cates of home rule at the convention did not realize that they had gone as far
as they had upon a reading of the majority opinion in the Salem case. In
short, the liberal interpretation rendered in Salem resulted in the grant of
"an unintended home rule power," according to Parkhurst. PARKHURST,
Status of Home Rule, supra note 303, at 6, 7.
392 54 Ill. 2d 561, 301 N.E.2d 281 (1973).
393See Cook County, Illinois, Ordinance 72-0-54, October 2, 1972
entitled "An Ordinance in Relation to the Powers and Duties of the

Comptroller."
8941d. at § 18.
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tion of ex-offieo comptroller from the county clerk of Cook
County and the placing of these functions in the hands of a
comptroller appointed by the county board.

After the circuit court found the ordinance to be unconstitutional in the quo warranto action brought by the state's attorney, the supreme court reversed this ruling with expansive
language regarding home rule authority to supersede statutes

existing prior to the effective date of the new constitution.
Article VII, section 6 (f) provides in pertinent part that a
home rule county has the power to provide for its officers, their
manner of selection and their terms of office in the manner set
forth in section 4 of article VII. 395
The majority opinion, authored by Mr. Justice Kluczynski,
noted initially that the creation of the office of comptroller was

a proper exercise of county authority under section 4 (c), but
stated that the essential question involved was not the possession
of this power, but rather "whether the duties given to said office
may supersede those granted by the legislature to another county
officer. ' "' 3 6 Specific reference in this regard was made to language of the Kanellos opinion, ,9 7 where, in the words of the
court, "we held that a home-rule county may adopt an ordinance
pursuant to its home rule power and thereby supersede a statute
antedating the present constitution. ' "' 11 Consequently, pursuant
to its home rule power granted in section 6 (a), Cook County
was deemed to possess the authority necessary to transfer the
powers, duties and functions among county officers, even to the

extent that such exercise conflicts with a statute enacted prior
395 The relevant provisions of article VII, section 4 state:

(c) Each county shall elect a sheriff, county clerk and treasurer
and may elect or appoint a coroner, recorder, assessor, auditor and such
other officers as provided by law or by county ordinance. Except as
changed pursuant to this Section, elected county officers shall be elected
for terms of four years at general elections as provided by law. Any
office may be created or eliminated and the terms of office and manner
of selection changed by county-wide referendum.
Offices other than
sheriff, county clerk and treasurer may be eliminated and the terms of
office and manner of selection changed by law. Offices other than
sheriff, county clerk, treasurer, coroner, recorder, assessor and auditor
may be eliminated and the terms of office and manner of selection
changed by county ordinance.
(d)
County officers shall have those duties, powers and functions
provided by law and those provided by county ordinance. County officers shall have the duties, powers or functions derived from common law
or historical precedent unless altered by law or county ordinance.
39c 54 Ill. 2d at 565, 301 N.E.2d at 283.
397 See the first paragraph of the text referred to by note 302 supra.
'9 54 Ill.2d at 565, 301 N.E.2d at 283.
The court specifically noted in this regard that no legislative enactment
had been made which would limit the power of the County Board exercised
in this case. Id.
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to the adoption of the 1970 Constitution unless otherwise limited
by action of the General Assembly.319
The court further noted that a consideration of sections 4 (c)
and 4 (d) in no manner alters this conclusion. Although section
4(d) authorizes the General Assembly and the county to determine the duties, powers and functions of county officers, the

court rejected the contention of the state's attorney that this
provision empowered counties merely to supplement the statutory
powers given to county officers. This determination was made
in the face of extensive constitutional convention opinion to the
contrary. 400 Furthermore, there was a seemingly contradictory
statement by a member of the Local Government Committee to
the effect that it was not possible for a county to alter the
statutory functions granted to constitutional county officials
(of whom the county clerk is one) .401 The court's holding was
based upon an interpretation of the intent underlying section
4 (c) - to give wide flexibility in the assignment of duties and
functions to county officials:
We further believe that to accept plaintiff's position might frustrate the implicit intent of section 4(c) of article VII, which
permits the creation of other offices to deal with the myriad
complex problems of local government because of the possibility
that certain functions of such offices might duplicate duties previ4 2
ously delegated to others. 0
After so stating, the court took pains to emphasize that it
was fully aware of the provision in section 4 (c) which permits
the elimination of offices such as the county clerk only by countyat 566, 301 N.E.2d at 283.
for this contention of the plaintiff was found in several of
the comments made during the debates on this subject. Delegate Dunn, for
example, was quoted as stating:
The words 'and by county ordinance' are included in the first
sentence to give an extra dimension of power to counties similar to that
given in the Municipal Code to municipalities so that the assigned duties
of municipal officers - or in this case, county officers - can be 'and
by county ordinance' in addition to those powers given to them in 'provided by law.'
Verbatim Transcripts, vol. IV at 3286. This remark was quoted in the brief
of Plaintiff-Appellee Hanrahan at 21.
401 The sheriff, county clerk and county treasurer were considered to be
constitutional county officials because theirs were the three chief policymaking offices in the county. Verbatim Transcripts, vol. V at 4163. As
such, they are provided with the highest protection afforded any of the county
offices by section 4 (c) which prohibits their elimination by any method other
than county-wide referendum.
Within the context of this information, the following colloquy is informative:
MR. FOSTER: I would ask Mr. Dunn a couple of preliminary questions. First of all, if the Legislature provided by general law that
certain offices such as the treasurer or sheriff had certain basic functions, would it be possible for a county ordinance to deviate from that?
399

Id.

40o Support

MR. DUNN: I don't think it would.
Verbatim Traneripts, vol. IV at 3289.
402

54 Ill. 2d at 566, 301 N.E.2d at 283.
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wide referendum. The actions of the Cook County Board of
Commissioners were considered consonant with the provision,
since there was no "elimination" of the office nor any major
step in that direction. 4 0 3 In view of this fact, the court refrained
from ruling on the validity of transfers of duties which result in
the substantial emasculation of county offices which can be
eliminated only by referendum. 4°4 Support for the statement
that the office of county clerk was not essentially affected
was found in the observation of the majority that the statutes
entrust the function of comptroller only to the county clerk
of Cook County, and the actions of the Cook County Board
merely reduced that office to one having substantially identical
40 5
functions to all other county clerks in Illinois.
A dissenting opinion was filed by Mr. Justice Ryan. Citing
section 4(d), which provides that county officers shall have
those duties, powers and functions provided by law and those
provided by county ordinance, Justice Ryan interpreted this
section to mean that the county cannot remove or alter statutory
duties, powers and functions, but can only add to this statutory
40 6
authority by ordinance.
The dissenting jurist also noted that the majority's reliance
upon Kanellos to support the position that the instant statute
could be superseded was misplaced. For in Ryan's view, the
present case was unlike Kanellos in that in Kanetlos it was
specifically found that the statutory provisions involved conflicted with provisions of the new constitution and, as such, were
not preserved by section 9 of the Transition Schedule.40 7 Since
there was no finding in Beck that the statutory duties of the
county clerk were contrary to or inconsistent with the new constitution, Mr. Justice Ryan opined that the powers, duties and
functions must remain in effect until repealed by the General
Assembly.4 08
The Beck opinion greatly expanded the liberal approach to
the question of applying pre-existing statutory provisions to the
home rule power initiated with the Kanellos decision. As Mr.
Justice Ryan aptly observed in his dissent, the Kanellos case
presented a limited factual situation where there was an obvious
conflict between statutory and constitutional provisions. The
Beck case, however, included no statutory inconsistency with
405

Id.

404

Id.

at 566, 301 N.E.2d at 283-84.

Id. at 567, 301 N.E.2d at 284.
Id.
407 Id.
at 568, 301 N.E.2d at 284.
See note 166 supra for a reading of the pertinent portion of section 9
405

40

of the Transition Schedule.
408 54 Ill. 2d at 568, 301 N.E.2d at 285.
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the constitution. Indeed, Beck was decided in the face of strong
evidence of convention opinion against action such as that taken
by Cook County in removing a statutory function from a constitutional county official and entrusting the function to an appointive official.
In light of the Beck opinion, home rule counties now have
wide authority to determine who among their elected and appointed officials shall exercise the many functions required of
county government. So long as an official is not substantially
stripped of his statutory functions, it appears that his authority
can be removed and given to another official at the discretion of
the county board. This declaration of home rule county power
gives rise to the opportunity for abuse, as indeed does the judicial
recognition of any and all home rule powers. By announcing
this recognition, the Illinois Supreme Court has impliedly declared that the exigencies of government require the possession
of this authority at the local level, with the General Assembly
able to act in only a residual capacity.
Home rule in Illinois, therefore, has been greatly enhanced
with the Beck decision.
THE FUTURE FOR ILLINOIS HOME RULE

This author concurs with those informed commentators
who are cautiously hopeful about the future of home rule in
Illinois.409 With the exception of the Bridgman41° and the Oak
Park411 decisions, the Illinois Supreme Court has indicated a
favorable approach toward the issue of home rule. Similarly,
the General Assembly has thus far imposed few restrictions
upon the exercise of home rule authority. 412
Despite this strong beginning, there is still some basis for
reserving judgment about the ultimate treatment of home rule
by both the judiciary and the legislature. As Arthur C. Thorpe
has noted:
The [home rule] provisions are fragile and can easily be
emasculated by an aroused legislature or by courts faced with
harsh factual situations. 41 3
409 See
COHN, Judicial Decisions, supra note 67, at 11; and COLE,
supra note 39, at 10.
41o See notes 314-29 supra.
411

See notes 355-75 supra.

See note 106 supra for a discussion of a statute, which has been
enacted limiting home rule authority, precluding local authority over the
licensing of thirty occupations. Additionally, H.B. 1050 and 1313 have been
passed during the 78th Session of the General Assembly which are intended
to cover home rule units. H.B. 1050 (P.A. 78-448) adds to the Open Meetings Act (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 102, §§ 41-44 (1973)) the statement that the
provision of the Act constitute minimum requirements for home rule units.
Said units may enact more stringent requirements if they desire. Similarly,
H.B. 1313 (P.A. 78-458) provides that state laws concerning public notice
412
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And as this author has observed throughout this article, the
problem of defining the general term "pertaining to its government and affairs" as found in article VII, section 6 (a), presents
an opportunity for the Illinois courts to strictly and narrowly
construe what constitutes a "local affair" so as to permit the
exercise of home rule authority. Indeed, such a restrictive
414
approach has already been utilized in the Bridgman case.
Additionally, although little legislation to limit home rule authority has been enacted by the Illinois General Assembly, many
4 15
such restrictive bills have been proposed.
Consequently, in order to insure that neither the courts
nor the legislature reduce home rule in Illinois to "a paradoxical
enigma ... unattainable to any significant degree, ' ' 6 the initiative has been thrust upon local governmental officials to enact responsible home rule legislation and to reasonably restrain the use
of their wide grant of home rule authority for only demonstrably
evidenced needs. In view of the obvious need of urban areas
for meaningful home rule authority, it is sincerely hoped that
home rule entities rise to meet this important challenge.
14

requirements 'shall apply to home rule as well as non home rule units. Once
again, more stringent requirements may be imposed by home rule units.
413 THORPE, supra note 58 at 10.
414
415

See notes 314-29 supra.

Sixty-seven bills were introduced during the 77th Session of the
General Assembly which were intended to preempt home rule powers.
Of those, approximately one-half received favorable votes in the House of
Representatives, but as noted in note 106 supra, only one bill was ultimately

enacted.
One legislator has been particularly active in his effort to curb home rule
authority. In April of 1971, for example, Representative John H. Conolly introduced thirty-eight preemptive bills (H.B. 2780-2817). Twenty-four of these
bills passed the House only to die on third reading in the Senate. It should
be noted that Conolly, as well as the other legislators who proposed preemptive legislation, were all Republicans. The voting patterns regarding
limiting or preemptive legislation appear to indicate that the opposing forces
have become the Chicago Democrats, who have protected home rule, against
the Republicans and many downstate Democrats, (including Democratic
House Majority Leader Choate who consistently voted present) who have
attacked home rule. As Eugene Green has noted, this voting pattern is not
favorable to those in Illinois who wish to see state legislative preemption
kept to a minimum. See GREEN, supra, note 5 at 5-7 and Madigan, A
Legislator Views Home Rule, Local Government Law Newsletter at 5 (Feb.
1973). (Published by the Illinois State Bar Association.)
416 See note 2 supra.

